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I.

INTRODUCTION

"State action"' is a doctrinal development of recent vintage
in Washington constitutional law. Before the 1970s, cases that
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1. This Article's discussion of "state action" theory in federal and Washington constitutional jurisprudence centers upon the dimension of the "state action" doctrine that
ascribes liability to governmental bodies for constitutionally injurious conduct by "nonstate" or "private" actors. Although the "state action" doctrine comprehends constitutionally violative conduct by "state" or "public" actors operating "under color of state
law," see, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (42 U.S.C. § 1983), Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), it is the doctrine's expansion
beyond the scope of formally "public" action to reach nominally "private" conduct that
has created what Professor Charles Black appropriately characterized as a "conceptual
disaster area." Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,and California'sProposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967).
As the reader will soon discover, whenever this Article alludes to the doctrine of
"state action," the phrase will be found enclosed in quotation marks. This use of punctuation is neither an oversight nor a stylistic oddity of the author. Rather, the deliberate
choice of form means to call the attention of the reader, at every encounter with the
doctrine, to the conceptual distinction between action perpetrated by the machinery of
government and nominally "private" action vicariously attributed to government by the
legal fiction of "state action." This is a conceptual distinction with a difference, given the
position of section V of this Article that the legal fiction cannot operate meaningfully
and justly to dichotomize the sphere of "private" actions into those vicariously attributable to the state and those not attributable to the state. The quotation marks should
prevent the reader from equating, either consciously or subliminally, the fiction of "state
action" with action of the machinery of government. It may be interesting to note that
other writers have employed this stylistic device in discussing the "state action" doctrine; this is not to suggest, of course, any necessary similarity in purpose. See, e.g., Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473 (1962);
Silard, A Constitutional Forecast: Demise of the "State Action" Limit on the Equal
Protection Guarantee, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 855 (1966). With apologies to the reader for
any mental distraction caused by the "state action" punctuation, intellectual disturbance
is precisely the objective.
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identified "state action" as a necessary element of causes of
action under the Washington Constitution examined direct and
purposeful activity by governmental officers or agencies. 2 In
Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center, Inc.,' the Washington courts first recognized the justiciability of a claim of right
under article I of the state constitution as against a nominally
private party.
The fermentation of the Washington "state action" doctrine
has been a relatively unimaginative phenomenon. As it has
matured, the state constitutional doctrine has mimicked the
substance and structure of its federal counterpart in the fourteenth amendment.4 There is nothing terribly surprising about
the similar flavor of the two "state action" concepts. The state
constitutional law cases that have shaped Washington's "state
action" doctrine generally disposed of simultaneous claims
under both federal and state bills of rights by construing the
article I provisions as substantively identical to the corresponding federal guarantees.5 Having matched the federal and state
sources of constitutional liberties, the Washington courts had
2. See, e.g., Cornelius v. City of Seattle, 123 Wash. 550, 556, 213 P. 17, 19 (1923)
(when a garbage collection contractor was deemed a public employee, a city ordinance
granting an exclusive franchise to the collector was held not to violate federal and state
constitutional due process and equal protection guarantees), overruled, Herriott v. City
of Seattle, 81 Wash. 2d 48, 500 P.2d 101 (1972); State ex rel. Holcombe v. Armstrong, 39
Wash. 2d 860, 866-67, 239 P.2d 545, 549 (1952) (in requiring x-rays of students over their
religious objections, the Board of Regents of the University of Washington exercised
legitimate police power as state actor).
3. 3 Wash. App. 833, 835, 478 P.2d 792, 793 (1970) (entry without consent on private
property in shopping center to solicit signatures for a political initiative protected by art.
I, §§ 4, 5, and 9 of the Washington State Constitution).
4. See infra § III text and accompanying notes. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
5. See, e.g., Long v. Chiropractic Soc'y of Wash., 93 Wash. 2d 757, 760, 613 P.2d
124, 127 (1980) (in holding that a reciprocal agreement between two chiropractic societies did not violate federal and state equal protection provisions for lack of state action,
court found that the provisions were "substantially identical mandates"); Allied Sheet
Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 10 Wash. App. 530, 539-40, 518
P.2d 734, 739-40 (creditor bank's seizure of debtor's bank account held not to violate
federal and state constitutional due process provisions, no distinction being made
between the substance of these guarantees), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974); Sutherland, 3 Wash. App. at 846 n.5, 478 P.2d at 799 n.5 ("Any right of the Council preserved
under the first amendment to the United States Constitution will also be preserved to
").
them by article 1, section 5 of the Washington State Constitution ....
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only to borrow from the full-bodied "state action" doctrine of
the fourteenth amendment to establish the properties of the
article I "state action" concept."
In its current state of maturation, the Washington "state
action" doctrine appears to have left a bitter taste in the mouths
of a plurality of the present state supreme court justices. Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council,7 a
recent analysis of the requisites of "state action" by Washington's highest court, exposes significant judicial discomfort with
the unvarying application of federal "state action" principles to
adjudicate claims against private individuals and entities arising
under state constitutional guarantees. Alderwood Associates
expresses the sentiment that the "state action" requirement of
the fourteenth amendment may be responsive to national governmental concerns immaterial to its complement in the state
constitution, and that parallelism in the Washington "state
action" doctrine wrongly may have prevented greater state constitutional protection of civil liberties.'
6. For example, the Sutherland court found "state action" by applying the fourteenth amendment analysis of Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), and Amalgamated
Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), overruled, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), in its determination that the private
shopping center mall and surrounding sidewalks were functionally similar to public business districts and thoroughfares. Sutherland, 3 Wash. App. at 837-45, 478 P.2d at 79499. Similarly, Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 10
Wash. App. 530, 539-40, 518 P.2d 734, 739-40, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974), used
federal case law to support its conclusion that the creditor bank's seizure of debtor's
deposits did not constitute "state action."
7. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 246, 635 P.2d 108, 117 (1981) (Washington State's constitutional
speech and petition guarantees permit the gathering of signatures in a privately owned
shopping mall). For full discussion of Alderwood Assocs., see infra text accompanying
notes 46-51.
8. The court in the plurality opinion in Alderwood Assocs. observed that the Washington Supreme Court has "often independently evaluated our state constitution and
[has] concluded that it should be applied to confer greater civil liberties than its federal
counterpart when the reasoning and evidence indicate such was intended and necessary."
96 Wash. 2d at 238, 635 P.2d at 113. Noting that prior state court opinions have relied
upon both overruled federal precedent and principles that have not evolved with the
changes in society, id. at 238-39, 635 P.2d at 113-14, the court stated that the "state
action" requirement of the fourteenth amendment is "the product of several factors not
relevant to state provisions." Id. at 241, 635 P.2d at 115. First, the United States
Supreme Court must find "the lowest common denominator" when promulgating new
rules, since the rules will be applicable to all the states: the Supreme Court must take
into account the laws and policies of the states and promulgate a rule acceptable to each
of them. Second, the new rules "must take a conservative theoretical approach to applying the Fourteenth Amendment" to preserve the states as laboratories for experimentation. These concerns require the Supreme Court to consider factors irrelevant to state
constitutional lawmaking. Id. at 242, 635 P.2d at 115.
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The time is ripe to establish the nature of the Washington
"state action" doctrine and its theoretical purposes, and to evaluate its capacity to serve the functions justifying its existence.
This Article will perform this exegesis. Section II describes the
classical liberal legal underpinnings of the federal constitutional
"state action" doctrine, explains the fourteenth amendment
"state action" doctrine's requirements, and outlines the rationales developed by the United States Supreme Court to satisfy
the requirements. Analysis of the fourteenth amendment "state
action" jurisprudence is necessary to any examination of "state
action" in the Washington Constitution because the Washington
Supreme Court developed the "state action" doctrine of article I
by adopting the fourteenth amendment "state action" requirements and rationales. Section III chronicles the complete incorporation of federal constitutional "state action" theory within
the Washington Constitution and argues that such wholesale
transference was not compelled by explicit commands of the
state constitutional text, by a comparison of the relevant federal
and state constitutional provisions, or by the substance and
spirit of the state constitution in its entirety. Section IV characterizes the theoretical purposes for a "state action" doctrine in
the federal Constitution, and explains the structural and substantive functions that the doctrine purportedly serves. Once
again, it is essential first to understand the conceivable purposes
for creation and maintenance of the doctrine in the fourteenth
amendment to evaluate the justifiability of the Washington Constitution's incorporation of federal "state action." Section V
establishes that the structural, or instrumental, functions for the
federal "state action" doctrine have little or no relevance to
Washington constitutional law declaration, and demonstrates
that the federal and state doctrines cannot achieve their substantive, or normative, function of balancing liberty and security
of rights in a meaningful and just fashion. Finally, Section VI
proposes the dismantlement of the Washington "state action"
doctrine and the recognition that cases involving competing private claims of state constitutional liberties present justiciable
controversies that must be decided by conscious and comprehensive judicial investigation of the merits.
II.

FEDERAL "STATE ACTION" THEORIES OF IDENTITY AND
CAUSALITY

As a matter of substantive federal constitutional law, the
"state action" doctrine is a judicial response to the notion that
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most individual liberties guaranteed by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments.9 The developmerit of the "state action" doctrine in fourteenth amendment
jurisprudence10 depends at its core upon the dichotomy established by the United States Supreme Court in the 1883 Civil
Rights Cases" between public and private deprivations of individual rights, only the former being subject to the prohibitions
of the amendment." At its inception, this essential distinction
9. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (private parties who
seize private property with the cooperation of state officials acting pursuant to state law
may be characterized as state actors for purposes of the fourteenth amendment); Flagg
Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (threatened sale of furniture under New York statute permitting warehouseman to sell stored goods does not constitute "state action" and
does not violate fourteenth amendment due process or equal protection); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (termination of electrical service by heavily
regulated private utility not "state action" for purposes of fourteenth amendment).
In Lugar, emphasizing that a finding of "state action" is a prerequisite to the application of due process standards, the Court cited Flagg Bros. for the proposition that the
"state action" requirement "reflects judicial recognition of the fact" that most constitutional rights are protected only against governmental violation. 457 U.S. at 936 (quoting
Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 156). In Flagg Bros., the plaintiff brought an action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, which, the Court determined, required in part a showing that Flagg's
action be "properly attributable to the State of New York." The Court observed that
"most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments." 436 U.S. at 156 (quoting Jackson, 419 U.S. at 349; The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 17-18 (1883)). In Jackson, the Court recognized "the essential dichotomy set
forth in that Amendment between deprivation by the State . . . and private conduct
however discriminatory or wrongful against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no
shield." 419 U.S. at 349 (quoting Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
10. This Article focuses solely upon fourteenth amendment jurisprudence to
examine the federal constitutional "state action" doctrine. Of course, the concept of
"state action" is important to analysis of other constitutional provisions, such as the
second through the eighth amendments and the fifteenth amendment as applied to federal governmental conduct. The United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the
fourteenth amendment, however, provide an adequately rich body of case law to explore
fully the structure, substance, and functions of the federal "state action" doctrine.
11. 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883) (§§ 1-2 of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, prohibiting private
discrimination by reason of race or previous condition of servitude and imposing sanctions for such discrimination, held to violate fourteenth amendment).
12. In the Civil Rights Cases, the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth amendment "does not invest Congress with the power to legislate upon subjects which are
within the domain of State legislation . . . . It does not authorize Congress to create a
code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights.
... Id. The fourteenth
amendment, however, does empower Congress to enact legislation "to provide modes of
relief against the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers, executive or
judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment." Id. The Court has reiterated this theme regularly in its fourteenth amendment
analysis. See, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936-37 (1982) (cites Civil
Rights Cases and Jackson for the proposition that the fourteenth amendment encom-
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between federally regulable public invasions of individual liberties and federally unregulable private wrongs of like nature was
understood to preserve a realm of individual freedom beyond
the reach of federal law, unless federal legislative and judicial
power redressed constitutional violations committed by the
state.13 The Supreme Court's original understanding that the
"state action" doctrine is fundamental to legal liberalism survives intact: in describing the consequence of the "state action"
doctrine as requiring "the courts to respect the limits of their
own powers as directed against state governments and private
interests," the Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 4 confirms
or bad policy, it is a fundamental
that "[w]hether this is good
' 5
fact of our political order.'
The relationship between the fourteenth amendment "state
action" doctrine and the tenets of legal liberalism perhaps is not
evident. There is, however, a logical connection between the reservation of federal judicial power for correction of public wrongs
and the classic tension in legal liberalism between liberty and
security of right.
Legal liberalism seeks to promote two goals in tandem: the
passes a "state action" requirement that renders private deprivations of constitutional
rights not "fairly attributable to the State" judicially unreachable); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349 (1974) ("the essential dichotomy set forth in that
amendment between deprivation by the state, subject to scrutiny under its provisions,
and private conduct. . . against which the Fourteenth Amendment offers no shield").
13. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14-15. The Supreme Court observed that,
were it to construe the fourteenth amendment to permit Congress to lay down rules for
the conduct of private individuals, the congressional power to prohibit certain state
action would be tantamount to a general, affirmative federal police power:
It would be to make Congress take the place of the State Legislatures and to
supersede them . . . .The truth is, that the implication of a power to legislate
in this manner is based upon the assumption that if the States are forbidden
to legislate or to act in a particular way on a particular subject, and power is
conferred upon Congress to enforce the prohibition, this gives Congress power
to legislate generally upon that subject, and not merely power to provide
modes of redress against such state legislation or action. The assumption is
certainly unsound. It is repugnant to the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution, which declares that powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people.
The perception of the Court that the federal "state action" doctrine preserves a realm of
individual freedom, regulated by constitutional state governance, beyond the reach of
federal law remains unchanged today. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,
936 (1982) ("Careful adherence to the 'state action' requirement preserves an area of
individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and federal judicial power.").
14. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
15. Id. at 936-37.
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liberty of the individual to pursue personal ends, and the security of the individual from infringements by others of this liberty. 16 The first goal presumes that the interest and value
16. The most celebrated philosophical statement of the tenets of classical legal liberalism is found in J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (Oxford ed. 1946) (1st ed. 1863), in which the
author examines the nature and limits of power that legitimate government can exercise
in restraint of individual liberty. Mill's thesis recognizes that the "struggle between Liberty and Authority" implicates the freedom of individual choice in ideas and practices:
[Tihere needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and
feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil
penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent
from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation,
of any individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compels all characters
to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.
Id. at 4. The struggle also implicates the security of the collectivity against injurious
exercises of personal liberties: "power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilised community against his will . . . [only] to prevent harm to others." Id. at 8-9.
The polarities of liberty and security of right, moreover, define the ends of "good government." Government must promote the liberty of the individual to pursue preferred
objectives: "[tihere is a limit to the legitimate interference of collective opinion with
individual independence: and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is
as indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against political despotism." Id. at 4. At the same time government must interfere with the liberty of action
for society's "self-protection": "the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is selfprotection." Id. at 8-9.
Mill's political philosophy of liberty as an individual and of a social good was largely
prefigured by the social contractarian theories of John Locke. In his Two TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, Locke argues that individuals create government only for specific and limited ends in regulation for the public good. J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT,
SECOND TREATISE § 3 (P. Laslett ed. 1960) (probably written in 1681). The beginning of
lawful government is the agreement among free men voluntarily to give up power to the
majority. Id. § 99. In so doing, power is vested in government to legislate and execute law
as the good of the collectivity requires. Id. § 131. The loss of some liberty, however, is
sustained only to preserve the remaining individual rights to liberty and property. Consequently, the power of government goes no further than to safeguard the personal
enjoyment of liberty and property and to secure the peace, safety, and integrity of the
community.
The American revolutionary leaders clearly understood the duality principle in liberal governance. The American Whig political platform at its foundation recognized the
dichotomy between liberty and governmental authority. See generally G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 18-28 (1972). Although holding that
the end of government, in sum, is the preservation of liberty, the American Whigs
acknowledged that liberty has both personal and public components: individual liberty
includes the "power which every Man has over his own Actions, and his Right to enjoy
the Fruit of his Labour, Art and Industry[,]" id. at 21 (citation omitted), but also the
right to participate in government and to live under the laws of the collectivity's own
making. Id. at 24. Thus, the confluence of personal and public liberty vests authority in
government to serve dual purposes: to provide a "constitutional check upon the power to
oppress[,]" id. at 25 (citation omitted), and to protect private liberties by "acting for the
general interest." Id.
For a comprehensive discussion of the evolution of classical analytical jurisprudence
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choices of one individual cannot be determined by society or
government to be inherently more worthy than the choices of
another (that is, "presumption of liberty"). The liberty of each
individual to pursue preferred interest and value choices is an
inalienable element of "humanity," and no just government
could fail to recognize and promote that liberty. The second goal
presumes that the liberty of an individual to pursue preferred
ends is only as strong as personal security from infringements on
such liberty (that is, "presumption of security of right"). Security from infringements of liberty can be effectuated in various
ways, the most obvious of which are self-help, negotiation, and
the rule of law. No just government could fail to recognize an
effective method of securing liberty whenever an individual
claims a legal right to be free from substantial infringements
upon personal capacity to pursue preferred ends.
The two goals of liberty and security of right inevitably
exist in tension. The former seeks to increase an individual's
power to affect others in order to achieve personal ends, and the
latter seeks to diminish the individual's power to affect others in
order to secure their interest and value choices. When, in a particular instance, two individuals cannot pursue their respective
ends without "checking" each other's exercise of personal liberties, a determination must be made as to the "point of delineation" at which the presumption of liberty wanes and the presumption of security waxes for both parties, or vice-versa. The
predominant problem of legal liberalism, therefore, is one of
line-drawing: the perpetual re-establishment of the place at
which a legitimate claim to17 liberty ends and a legitimate claim
to security of right begins.
as a function of the endeavor to resolve the inherent tension between the major tenets of
liberal legal theory, see Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence
from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REv. 975. Singer describes liberal legal theory as
"founded on a contradiction." The "fundamental contradiction" exists "between the
principle that individuals may legitimately act in their own interest to increase their
wealth, power, and prestige at the expense of others and the principle that they have a
duty to look out for others and to refrain from acts that hurt them." Id. at 980. Singer
labels the former the principle of "freedom of action" and the latter the principle of
"security." Id.
17. Translating the "contradiction between freedom of action and security" into the
"contradiction between individual rights and state powers," Singer characterizes the
"predicament of liberal legal theory" as "determin[ing] the extent to which individual
freedom of action may legitimately be limited by collective coercion over the individual
in the name of security." Id. (citing J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTv 10-11 (Norton ed. 1975);
Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 205, 209-13
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The classical response to the predominant problem of legal
liberalism has been that, at the very least, the presumption of'
liberty should prevail when an individual attempts to pursue
personally preferred ends by actions that are "self-regarding,"
that are neither intended to injure, nor in fact result in any significant harm to, the efforts of others to pursue their interest
and value choices. Conversely, the presumption of security of
right should prevail, and government should ensure an effective
recourse to protect the'freedoms of potentially injured parties,
when an individual's actions to pursue personally preferred ends
are unduly "other-regarding," threatening significant harm to
the interest and value choices of others. 8
Classical liberal legal theory understood that a complainant
who sought governmental rectification of injury to an interest
allegedly secured by law as a matter of right would claim, in
essence, that law imposed a duty upon the defendant not to act
in an unduly "other-regarding" fashion with respect to complainant's legally granted realm of freedom of action.1 9 In con(1979)).
18. See J.S. MILL, supra note 16, at 8-9. Mill carefully developed the thesis that
legitimate state regulation may be imposed only to control an individual's "other-regarding" conduct. Mill argued forcefully "[t]hat the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member . . . against his will, is to prevent harm to others."
The conduct must be intended to produce or have the primary effect of producing evil to
another. Id. On the other hand, an individual's actions, even if morally unsound or
rationally unwise, that affect only the actor himself or herself, provide no sufficient justification for state compulsion to alter behavior. "In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute." Over one's self, over decisions centrally concerning one's own body and mind, the individual is "sovereign." Id. at 9. See also Singer,
supra note 16, at 980-81, 984-85, 995-1014 (classical analytical jurists, including John
Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham, and John Austin, invented a "meta-theory based on the
distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding acts," the purpose of which was
to mediate the fundamental contradiction between freedom of action and security). The
"self-regarding" and "other-regarding" distinction served as the rationalizing principle
for liberal legal theory in American jurisprudence until the turn of the twentieth century,
when the classical analytical school lost ground to the nominalists, particularly John
Salmond and Wesley Hohfeld. Id. at 1042-56.
19. Classical liberal legal theory associates the imposition of legal duties not to act
or to forebear with the creation of legally securable rights. Because legal rights provide
governmental security from harm to recognized interests, liberal legal theory understands that legally granted rights or recognized liberties are correlated with legal duties
not to trammel the secured freedoms of action. See Singer, supra note 16, at 998 (John
Stuart Mill's theory understood correlative duties not to interfere with liberties); id. at
1005-07 (distinguishing legal liberties and uncorroborated liberties, Jeremy Bentham
posited that both "coercive laws" and "permissive laws" are accompanied by either
explicit or implicit corroborative duties); id. at 1009-11 (John Austin's analytical system
understood "relative duty" as the basis and correlating expression of "right," and uncorroborated liberties as no legal right at all).
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traposition, the defendant would assert either that law imposed
no such duty to forebear from the action challenged or that law
affirmatively empowered defendant so to act, or both; assuming
such duty, defendant would argue that the challenged action was
not or would not be unduly "other-regarding," or that such
"other-regarding" action was not or would not be the cause of
injury to complainant's alleged liberties. The decision that the
presumption of liberty or the presumption of security of right
should prevail in this scenario is based upon the possibility of
making at least three crucial determinations:
(1) The allegedly violative action can be attributed to definite and particular actors with or without a legal duty not to
act or to forebear;
(2) The allegedly violative action can be characterized as
either "self-regarding" or "other-regarding";
(3) The allegedly violative action can or cannot be established as the "cause" of the injury challenged.
The dichotomy between "public" and "private" deprivations of individual rights in the federal constitutional "state
action" doctrine can be explained in terms of the classical
response to legal liberalism's internal conflict. The "state action"
doctrine ensures access to government for protection of legally
recognized rights against a category of activity that is clearly
"other-regarding."
When individuals congregate for the
acknowledged purpose of governing the conduct of persons and
entities in society, the governing body that represents the
"state" is presumed to act uniformly in an "other-regarding"
fashion. By characterizing the totality of the conduct of governmental institutions, officers, and agents categorically as "public
action" that is "other-regarding" and all other conduct that cannot be imputed reasonably to governmental institutions, officers,
and agents as "private action" that is "self-regarding," the
"state action" doctrine eliminates the second inquiry necessary
to federal judicial determination of the classical liberal resolution whether the presumption of liberty or security of right
should prevail when a complainant alleges significant infringement of a constitutional liberty.2 ° The "state action" doctrine
20. The text asserts that, in the context of federal constitutional adjudication, the
"state action" doctrine disposes of the second inquiry in classical liberal legal decisionmaking whether the presumption of liberty or the presumption of security of right
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establishes that the presumption of security of right will control,
to the extent that the federal judiciary will enforce constitutionally recognized liberties as against allegedly violative action,
upon the possibility of making the following two determinations:
(1) The allegedly violative action can be attributed to definite and particular institutions or individuals that are identified as "state actors" with a federal constitutional duty not
to deny or deprive -recognized liberties;
(2) Whatever allegedly violative action is found attributable
to "state actors" can be demonstrated to have "caused" the
denial or deprivation of liberty in issue.
Having grounded the presumption of security of federal
constitutional right upon these two determinations, the "state
action" doctrine requires the federal judiciary to articulate the
circumstances in, conditions under, and rationales for which
allegedly violative action can be identified with the state and can
be specified as the cause of injury to guaranteed freedoms. Perforce, the "state action" inquiries demand the formulation of a
Theory of Identity that prescribes those circumstances, conditions, or rationales whereby challenged conduct may be identified with "state actors," and the formulation of a Theory of Causality that prescribes those circumstances, conditions, or
rationales whereby challenged conduct may be labelled as the
"cause" of constitutional injury. The "state action" doctrine will
empower the federal judiciary to secure constitutional liberties,
therefore, only upon judicial determination that the complainant's allegations have satisfied the requirements of a Theory of
Identity and a Theory of Causality.
Fourteenth amendment jurisprudence unambiguously has
acknowledged that federal justiciability of a cause of action
requires satisfaction of both a Theory of Identity and a Theory
of Causality in order that infringement of constitutional rights
be assigned to "state action. '21 As articulated by the United
should prevail. Alternatively, the "state action" doctrine may be viewed as shifting to the
appropriate legislature, be it the United States Congress acting under its authority to
regulate private civil rights, see infra note 77, or the state legislature acting within its
general police powers, the determination whether the presumption of liberty or security
of right should prevail in the future in doctrinally and factually similar cases.
21. This Article describes the satisfaction of the Theory of Identity and the Theory
of Causality as directed primarily to the question of federal justiciability of a cause of
action under the fourteenth amendment of the federal Constitution. In current fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, of course, a finding of "state action" means a great
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States Supreme Court in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.:
Our cases have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly
causing the deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable
to the State. These cases reflect a two-part approach to this
question of "fair attribution." First, the deprivation must be
caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the
State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a
person for whom the State is responsible . . . . Second, the
party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a
state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.2 2
deal more: the private behavior alleged by the complainant to be violative of constitutional liberties will be subject to the same substantive restraints as governmental behavior. The Article's narrower focus upon "state action" as the threshold prerequisite to
justiciability can be justified, however, for two reasons. First, the focus is appropriate in
light of the instrumental functions theoretically served by the federal "state action"
requirement. As explained fully in section IV, infra, the two major instrumental values
advanced by the "state action" doctrine concern issues of the justiciability of the federal
courts. Although a broader focus may be compelled by the doctrine's normative purpose
described in section IV, the Article subsequently argues that the Theories of Identity
and Causality cannot meaningfully discharge their normative function. See infra section
V. Second, the focus is appropriate in light of the proposal for dismantling the "state
action" doctrine in the Washington Constitution, examined in section VI, infra. This
proposal does not conceive that state court justiciability of constitutional claims against
private parties necessarily subjects private behavior to the same substantive restraints as
governmental behavior in a determination on the merits. The state identity of the
alleged wrongdoer may be a consideration for the judiciary in deciding the merits of the
competing claims of right, and may even be the determinative factor for judgment in
particular cases. See infra text accompanying notes 124-26. The proposal understands,
however, that the presence of "state action" is not to be the sine qua non for judicial
application of substantive restraints to private behavior, but does not promote the automatic submission of all private conduct to the standards of liability imposed upon governmental officers and institutions.
22. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937. See also Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 351-52 (1974) (even if Metropolitan Edison can be identified with the State of Pennsylvania by the grant or guarantee of a monopoly status in utility services, there must be
a sufficient causal relationship between the challenged actions of Metropolitan Edison
and its monopoly status). Cf. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722
(1961) (racially discriminatory practices of private restaurateur violated fourteenth
amendment on basis that private business and state agency entwined in a mutually economically beneficial enterprise). In finding an equal protection violation, the Court in
Burton first examined the relationship between the state and the restaurant, and concluded that the restaurant was an "integral part of a public building." Id. at 724. The
Court next reasoned that the state not only failed to require racially integrated service
by the restaurant, but put its prestige and power behind the discrimination. Id. at 725.
Without explicitly delineating the theories of the federal "state action" doctrine, the
Court clearly identified the private restaurant with the state and demonstrated that the
state itself perpetrated the constitutional violation.

1985]

Washington "State Action" Doctrine

Although addressed in the reverse of the order discussed above,
the Theories of Identity and Causality are the essence of the
federal court's two-part inquiry to establish "state action."
Under the Theory of Identity, the United States Supreme
Court has struggled to formulate rationales that explain when
and why injurious activity by a putatively nongovernmental
actor is, in reality, the activity of the state. The Court has
appeared to go about this task on an ad hoc basis by identifying
a "status relationship" between the private party and the government, created or sanctioned by the government, so that the
private party and the government reasonably could be held to
have acted "as one."
The United States Supreme Court has found such "status
relationships" in a variety of different contexts for which it has
enunciated a corresponding number of formulae or tests. 3 First,
a status relationship may be identified when the private party
"undertakes" the character, responsibilities, and benefits of a
traditional governmental body with the evident authorization or
recognition of the state. The Theory of Identity may be satisfied
under this rationale when the state expressly has delegated powers or functions traditionally governmental in nature to be performed by the private party, thereby vesting the private party
with actual or apparent authority as a state agent or instrumentality.2" The private party may also "undertake" a state identity
23. The taxonomy of the Theories of Identity and Causality in the text classifies
and describes the rationales developed over the evolution of the fourteenth amendment
"state action" doctrine to distinguish "status relationships" of magnitude and intensity
sufficient to attribute private wrongdoing to state government. At this point, it is necessary to caution that the current status of the federal "state action" doctrine may have
substantially limited, if not totally defused, the force of any particular rationale. E.g.,
compare Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (entwinement in
a mutually economically beneficial enterprise) with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974) (state-granted or -guaranteed monopoly status in utility services alone is not determinative of sufficiency of relationship between state and challenged actions of the private entity). For expository reasons, analysis of the recent doctrinal retrenchment in the Theories of Identity and Causality is reserved for discussion
in Section V, infra text accompanying notes 94-114.
24. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1953) (election held by private
political club in which blacks could not vote deemed "state action" violating fourteenth
amendment since purpose of the election was to select, without minority participation,
primary candidates to be ratified officially in the Democratic primary election); Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 663-64 (1943) (when state primary elections in Texas were run
by the state Democratic Party but state statutes regulated the primary process, refusal
by the party to permit a black vote in the primary election solely on the basis of race
violated the fourteenth amendment). The Smith Court held:
We think that this statutory system for the selection of party nominees for
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without the express state delegation of its powers, by "holding
forth" as the functional equivalent of a state, with the evident
knowledge and tacit acquiescence of the state.25
Second, federal courts may identify a status relationship
when the private party and the government coordinate or combine their respective efforts in a common enterprise to such a
degree that their independent activities become intermingled
and can no longer be distinguished as autonomous. Under this
rationale, the Theory of Identity may comprehend an affirmative
"entwinement" or "nexus" between the state and the private
party in a proprietary relationship of mutual economic benefit
when the state can be fairly held as a partner to the injurious
conduct of that enterprise.26 Similarly, when the private party
acts jointly with the state, or in conspiracy with the state, to
achieve a purpose unattainable without significant governmental7
involvement, the private activity may be imputed to the state.1
inclusion on the general election ballot makes the party which is required to
follow these legislative directions an agency of the State in so far as it determines the participants in a primary election. The party takes its character as a
state agency from the duties imposed upon it by state statutes ....
Id.
25. See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (consistent with first and fourteenth amendments, state cannot impose punishment for distribution of religious literature in a company town when distribution is prohibited by regulations of the town's
management). The Court noted that "the town and its shopping district are accessible to
and freely used by the public in general, and there is nothing to distinguish them from
any other town and shopping center except for the fact that the title to the property
belongs to a private corporation." Id. at 503. Thereupon, the Court reasoned that
"[s]ince these facilities are built and operated primarily to benefit the public, and since
their operation is essentially a public function, it is subject to state regulation[,I" and the
state had permitted the corporation to operate a "business block." Id. at 506-07. As a
result, private corporate ownership of the property was held an insufficient defense to
the charge that the state had deprived residents of the company town and members of
the public of their constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reiterated the "holding
forth" analysis, labelling it the "public function" test, in its examination of "state
action" in Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (citing Marsh and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953)).
26. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 (1961) (by its
financial dealings with the private restaurateur in establishing the public parking garage
and restaurant, and by the financial benefit derived from its lease to the restaurant,
"[tihe State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle
that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity").
27. See, e.g., Lugar, 457 U.S. at 941 ("a private party's joint participation with state
officials in the seizure of disputed property is sufficient to characterize that party as a
'state actor' for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,
398 U.S. 144, 170 (1969) (fourteenth amendment "state action" requirement met when
segregation exists in private restaurant as a result of state compulsion of racial discrimination, either by statute or by community custom having the force of law).
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Although particular actions of a private party may be
ascribed to the government under one of the rationales satisfying the Theory of Identity, the fourteenth amendment "state
action" doctrine will not recognize a claim of right as justiciable
unless it also passes muster under the Theory of Causality. The
Theory of Causality requires a colorable showing that the particular activity identified with the state affirmatively and proximately caused the deprivation of liberty alleged. Unless those
dimensions of the private enterprise identified as "state action"
substantially "committed" the injury complained of, the Theory
of Causality will not assign liability to governmental decisionmaking or operations."8 The Theory of Causality functions to
limit state responsibility to involvement that directly inflicts
potentially unconstitutional injury, for which the state might be
held atomistically "blameworthy." 9
The Supreme Court has proffered a number of rationales to
elucidate the essential distinction in the Theory of Causality
between "action-inaction" or "commission-omission" by the
state.3 0 The state may be held to have involved itself affirma28. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (approval
by the state utility commission of a regulated utility company's general tariff, "where the
commission has not put its own weight on the side of the proposed practice by ordering
it, does not transmit a practice initiated by the utility and approved by the commission
into 'state action' "); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (racially discriminatory guest policies of a private club do not violate the fourteenth amendment despite
the fact that the state licensed the club to serve liquor). In Moose Lodge, the Court
reasoned that the licensing laws of the state did not directly or indirectly foster the
discriminatory practices of the club. As a result, "the operation of the regulatory scheme
enforced by the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board does not sufficiently implicate the
state in the discriminatory guest policies of the Moose Lodge to make the latter 'state
action' within the ambit of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 177.
29. See generally Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination through Antidiscrimination Law: A CriticalReview of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049
(1978). In his elucidating article, Professor Freeman explains fourteenth amendment
jurisprudence as viewing racial discrimination from a "perpetrator perspective," from
which one "sees racial discrimination not as conditions, but as actions or series of actions
inflicted on the victim by the perpetrator." Id. at 1053. The law, therefore, will require
the victim of discrimination to link the discrimination to the behavior of a perpetrator; it
will address only the discrimination caused by the perpetrator, and then only action that
in fact has a discriminatory effect. Id. at 1056. See also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 936 ("state
action" requirement "avoids imposing on the state, its agencies or officials, responsibility
for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed").
30. Similar to the description of the Theory of Identity, the taxonomy of the Theory
of Causality in the text highlights the rationales historically employed to distinguish
between "state action" and governmental inaction, omission, or mere acquiescence.
Again, a cautionary note is warranted to alert the reader that case precedents for partic-
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tively and substantially with private wrongdoing if governmental
activity has specifically authorized or approved the private practice that proximately caused a deprivation of liberty, so that the
state fairly may be understood to have ratified the injurious conduct.3 1 Moreover, a positive commission may exist when the
facts of the case establish such significant "encouragement" by
the state for the private party's choice of action that the state
may be considered to have requested or cooperated with the private infringement of liberty.32
III.

PARALLELISM IN WASHINGTON'S "STATE ACTION"

DOCTRINE

State court construction of the Washington Bill of Rights
has evolved a "state action" doctrine that differs insignificantly
from its federal counterpart. Washington's "state action" concept incorporates the fourteenth amendment's requirements of a
Theory of Identity and a Theory of Causality and substantially
subsumes the federal content of both theories. When the Washular rationales may no longer be persuasive authority in light of more recent developments in fourteenth amendment "state action" law. See infra notes 31-32 (comparing
the "ratification" rationale of Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952), and
the "encouragement" rationale of Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), with the
restrictive readings given these rationales in Jackson and Flagg Bros.). Discussion of the
recent doctrinal retrenchment in the Theory of Causality is presented in Section V,
infra.
31. See, e.g., Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 463-65 (1952) (consistent
with first and fifth amendments, the P.U.C. of District of Columbia may permit receipt
and amplification of radio programs on railway system regulable under its statutory
authority). The Court found federal governmental action in the general regulation of the
railway system by an agency established by Congress, coupled with the fact that, after
protests regarding the broadcast transmissions, the P.U.C. investigated, held hearings
upon, and approved the practice. Id. at 462. Cf. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164
(1978) (mere acquiescence by the state in a private sale of property under color of state
law does not convert private conduct into "state action").
32. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967) (California constitutional provision that effectively repealed state anti-housing discrimination statutes and
essentially permitted private discrimination in sale of residential housing held "state
action" violative of fourteenth amendment). The Court cited the California Supreme
Court's interpretation of the provision as expressly constitutionalizing the right to discriminate, in concluding that the provision would "encourage and significantly involve
the State in private racial discrimination contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at
375-76. Cf. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165-66 (1978) (when state statute
"merely announced the circumstances under which its courts will not interfere with a
private sale[,J" denial of judicial relief held not sufficient encouragement to deem state
responsible for private deprivations of property); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974) (private utility's exercise of choice of practice permitted by state
law does not make its action doing so "state action" for fourteenth amendment purposes
"where the initiative comes from it and not from the State").
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ington doctrine diverges from federal constitutional jurisprudence, it does so grudgingly: the traditional elements of a "state
action" inquiry to determine threshold justiciability resurface at
a later stage in the judicial definition of a cognizable cause of
action. The evolution of "state action" in article I of the Washington Constitution proves the adage "plus qa change, plus c'est
la mme chose."
With explicit reliance upon federal constitutional precedent,
article I "state action" law developed by emulating the basic
parameters of the fourteenth amendment's Theories of Identity
and Causality. Construing article I, section 5 of the Washington
State Constitution to protect rights of free speech as extensively
as the first amendment of the United States Constitution, but
only as against "state action," the Washington courts set a toehold for the Theory of Identity in the Washington Constitution
by recognizing the "holding forth" and "public function" ratibnales in Sutherland v. Southcenter Shopping Center.3 3 Finding
sufficient "state action" in the statutory authorization and summary official execution of prejudgment garnishment of private
corporate assets, the Washington Supreme Court in Olympic
Forest Products, Inc. v. Chaussee Corp. significantly fleshed
out the Theory of Identity by adopting the "delegation" rationale to examine a due process claim under article I, section 3 of
the Washington Constitution." The article I, section 3 due pro33. 3 Wash. App. 833, 478 P.2d 792 (1970) (entry without consent on private property in shopping center to solicit signatures for political initiative was protected by art. I,
§§ 4, 5, & 9 of Washington State Constitution). The Sutherland court recognized the
factual similarities between the political speech activities in the case at bar and the protected first amendment conduct in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v.
Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968) (picketing of private property in shopping
center), overruled, Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), and Marsh v. Alabama,
326 U.S. 501 (1946) (distribution of religious literature in company town), in relying
upon the rationales that the United States Supreme Court established for the federal
Theory of Identity. After an inquiry into the nature and use of the private property in
the shopping center mall and surrounding sidewalks, the Sutherland court concluded
that, analogous to the federal precedents, the property was the "functional equivalent of
streets and sidewalks" and "serve[d] as a business block." Sutherland, 3 Wash. App. at
842-44, 478 P.2d at 798.
34. 82 Wash. 2d 418, 511 P.2d 1002 (1973) (prejudgment garnishment of a corporation's bank account without prior notice and opportunity for hearing violates the due
process guarantee of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and of
art. I, § 3 of the Washington Constitution).
35. Id. at 428, 511 P.2d at 1008. Relying on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67 (1972), the Washington Supreme Court held the corporate bank account to constitute a significant property interest, Olympic, 82 Wash. 2d at 429, 511 P.2d at 1010,
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cess clause provided equally fertile ground for transplanting the
"entwinement" and "nexus" rationales to determine that the
necessary prerequisite of "significant state involvement" will not
be found in nonjudicial self-help between private parties.3"
Apart from subsuming the fourteenth amendment Theory
of Identity within the "state action" doctrine of article I, the
Washington Supreme Court has established that a determination of constitutionally justiciable "state action" must involve a
second and separate inquiry, which in essence models the federal
and found "state action" by virtue of the fact that, as in Fuentes, "the state has abdicated control over state power." Id. at 434, 511 P.2d at 1012. Because the state statute
authorized judicial issuance of a writ of prejudgment garnishment upon a creditor's filing
of an affidavit and bond, without any state review or evaluation of the substantive claims
to right of replevin, the Olympic court concluded that "[tihe State acts largely in the
dark." Id. (quoting Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 93).
36. See, e.g., Allied Sheet Metal Fabricators, Inc. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank of Wash., 10
Wash. App. 530, 540, 518 P.2d 734, 740 (1974) (bank holding notes due and payable by a
depositor may set off his indebtedness without procedural due process guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment and art. I, § 3 of the Washington Constitution). The Allied court
cited Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), and Moose Lodge No.
107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), to support its determination that private interactions
between a borrower and a lending institution allegedly violating due process property
rights, taken without seeking state help and without direct participation of state officials,
do not involve the government "to some significant extent" sufficient for a finding of
"state action." Allied, 10 Wash. App. at 540, 518 P.2d at 740. In the first Washington
Supreme Court case to extend the federal "entwinement" or "nexus" rationale to the
Washington Constitution through art. I, § 3, Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. Scott, 86
Wash. 2d 276, 278, 543 P.2d 638, 640 (1975) (self-help provision of the Uniform Commercial Code does not involve "state action" and is not subject to the due process requirements of the federal and state constitutions), the court relied upon its earlier analysis
and decision in Faircloth v. Old Nat'l Bank of Wash., 86 Wash. 2d 1, 4, 541 P.2d 362, 363
(1975) (fourteenth amendment holding), to establish that, without more, the state does
not significantly involve itself in private conduct when it merely codifies existing common-law rights and remedies. Thus, Borg-Warner recognized that private action does
not come within the ambit of art. I, § 3 due process guarantees "unless significantly
intertwined with state involvement[,]" as stated in Faircloth, 86 Wash. 2d at 3, 541 P.2d
at 363 (citing Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. at 163). Borg-Warner, 86 Wash. 2d at 278, 543 P.2d
at 640.
The "entwinement" and "nexus" rationales have also found footing as the governing
standards for the Theory of Identity in WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 protections for rights of
privacy, see, e.g., In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120-21, 660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983) (right
to privacy permits termination of life-support systems for terminally ill patient) (reliance
upon the Jackson standard of "sufficiently close nexus between State and challenged
action of regulated entity," Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351
(1974)), and in the Equal Rights Amendment, WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1, see, e.g.,
MacLean v. First N.W. Indus. of America, Inc., 96 Wash. 2d 338, 347-48, 635 P.2d 683,
688 (1981) (half-price basketball tickets on "ladies' night" not violative of art. XXXI, § 1
equal protection guarantees on basis of gender) (reading a "state action" requirement
into art. XXXI, § 1 and applying the "entwinement" analysis of Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), to examine the "state action" inquiry).
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Theory of Causality. Upholding the Washington Trust Deed Act
against a challenge on federal and state constitutional due process grounds, the Washington Supreme Court in Kennebec v.
Bank of the West 7 concluded that "state action" cannot be
predicated upon the enactment of permissive state laws that
merely authorize and, to that extent, encourage private conduct.
For significant state involvement sufficient to constitute "state
action," Kennebec required a showing of "active participation"
by the state in the violative private conduct at issue. Although
satisfying the Theory of Identity as action attributable to the
state, the enactment of a permissive statute, without more, consisted of nonjusticiable "passive participation. 8 The embodiment of the "action-inaction" dichotomy of the fourteenth
amendment Theory of Causality in this distinction between
"active-passive state participation" limited the federal "encouragement" rationale for purposes of the Washington "state
action" doctrine to direct assistance or interaction of a state official or agency to further the authorized private conduct. 9
The Washington constitutional "state action" doctrine
reached complete incorporation of the federal Theories of Identity and Causality by 1980, as evidenced by the state supreme
court's decision in Long v. Chiropractic Society of Washington.4 0 Viewing the equal protection clause of article I, section 12
37. 88 Wash. 2d 718, 565 P.2d 812 (1977) (foreclosure of deed of trust does not
violate federal or state constitutional due process rights since state enactment of statute
permitting private nondiscriminatory conduct is "passive" state involvement not constituting "state action").
38. For significant state involvement, active participation by the state in some
manner must be found to constitute 'state action' for due process purposes
... . [Slignificant 'state action' cannot be predicated upon such passive
involvement as the enactment of permissive state laws which merely authorize,
and to that extent, encourage private conduct.
Id. at 722, 725-26, 565 P.2d at 815-16.
39. The Kennebec court alluded to the issuance of a writ of prejudgment garnishment considered in Olympic Forest Products, Inc. v. Chaussee Corp., 82 Wash. 2d 418,
511 P.2d 1002 (1973), as an example of active state participation. In its definition of
"active involvement," the court adopted the reasoning of the Oregon Supreme Court in
Brown v. United States Nat'l Bank, 265 Or. 234, 509 P.2d 442 (1973), which had invoked
the Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 389 (1967), "encouragement" rationale to find "state
action" "to the extent that the state could be said to be the instigator or the accomplice
of acts amounting to encouragement." Kennebec, 88 Wash. 2d at 723-24, 565 P.2d at 815
(quoting Brown, 265 Or. at 241, 509 P.2d at 446). The Kennebec holding foreshadowed
the retrenchment of the "encouragement" rationale in the federal Theory of Causality
through Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), and Flagg Bros. v.
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978). See infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
40. 93 Wash. 2d 757, 613 P.2d 124 (1980) (private agency authorized by state statute
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of the Washington Constitution and the federal equal protection
guarantee as "substantially identical mandates," the court
applied a three-prong test to examine the question of "significant state action.""' The three-prong test reiterates the essence
of the "entwinement" and "nexus" rationales of the Theory of
Identity4 2 and the "omission" and "encouragement" rationales
of the Theory of Causality. 3 In effect, it insists that the complainant preliminarily satisfy a stringent examination of a "status relationship" between the opposing private party and the
government so as fairly to attribute private action to the state
and of a fact-specific "causal connection" so as to establish the
nature of state action as the direct source of injury.44
Recently, however, rumblings of judicial discomfort with
federal "state action" parallelism in the Washington Bill of
Rights have attained a seismographically significant level. In
major deviation from synonymity with the federal "state action"
doctrine, a plurality of four Washington Supreme Court justices
to sponsor or conduct professional relicensing symposia does not violate federal or state
equal protection guarantees by charging members of some organizations more than members of others).
41. The Long court relied on Moose Lodge No. 197 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972),
and Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967), via the Washington Supreme Court's
decision in Kennebec, 88 Wash. 2d at 721, 565 P.2d at 814, for the "state action" standard of "significant state involvement." Long, 93 Wash. 2d at 761, 613 P.2d at 127. The
"three-prong" test used to establish the sufficiency of state involvement was borrowed
from Aasum v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 395 F. Supp. 363, 367 (D. Or. 1975), aff'd, 542
F.2d 792 (9th Cir. 1976), and inquires: "(1) Was the state's involvement with the institution significant? (2) Is the state involved, not simply with some activity of the institution, but with the activity that caused the injury (the so-called nexus requirement)? and
(3) Did the state's involvement aid, encourage or connote approval of the complained
activity?" Long, 93 Wash. 2d at 761-62, 613 P.2d at 127.
42. The first prong of the Long test invokes the language of Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961), and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419
U.S. 345, 351-52 (1974), to inquire as to the "significant involvement" of the state with
the private conduct at issue. See generally supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
43. The second prong requires the affirmative and proximate causal link between
the dimensions of the private enterprise identified with the state and the alleged injurious conduct, demanded in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972), and
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 165 (1978). See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying
text. Similar to Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 380 (1967), Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 357 (1974), and Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 165, the third prong
looks to the character of the state involvement as encouraging or connoting approval of
the complained activity.
44. Plaintiff's claims in Long failed the stringent three-pronged examination
because the court found no substantive "nexus" between the relicensing symposium fee
arrangement and the mandates of the authorizing state statute, and because the statute
did not directly compel, encourage, or approve the challenged fee schedule and reciprocal
reduction agreement. Long, 93 Wash. 2d at 762, 613 P.2d at 128.
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endorsing the Opinion of the Court in Alderwood Associates v.
Washington Environmental Council"' read the free speech and
initiative guarantees in article I, section 5 and amendment 7 of
the Washington Constitution "as not requiring the same 'state
action' as the Fourteenth Amendment."" Observing that neither
article I, section 5 nor amendment 7 is by express terms limited
to governmental actions, the plurality argued that the provisions
should not be so interpreted. The inference of a federal "state
action" prerequisite to justiciability of an article I, section 5 or
amendment 7 claim may deny constitutional safeguards against
private conduct interfering with important free speech interests
and initiative processes, without fulfilling equally compelling
countervailing purposes. The "state action" doctrine of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution responds
to institutional concerns of the federal judiciary that are irrelevant to state constitutional law declaration. 7 The plurality proposed that a balancing approach, weighing all interests material
to the conflicting claims of individual rights and of state police
power necessities, would serve to determine whether state constitutional speech and initiative guarantees apply to the particular private conduct at bar, while freeing the state courts from
the constraints imposed by the threshold inquiry that invokes
the Theories of Identity and Causality to promote appropriate
federal judicial self-restraint.4"
45. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
46. Id. at 243, 635 P.2d at 116.
47. Id. at 242, 635 P.2d at 115. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. For a
discussion of the second factor mentioned by the Alderwood Assocs. court, i.e., the federal "state action" doctrine's function in preserving federalism, see infra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text, and for a discussion of the immateriality of this rationale as a justification for the Washington "state action" doctrine, see infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text.
48. Among the factors considered relevant by the court in Alderwood Assocs. to balance the separate interests of the petitioner, the private shopping center, and the state,
the plurality first examined the nature and use of the private property, observing that
the owner enjoys a reduced expectation of privacy as it becomes the functional
equivalent of a public forum. Id. at 244, 635 P.2d at 116. Second, the opinion regarded
the nature of the speech activity, noting that the activity takes on added constitutional
significance when the speech constitutes political advocacy. Id. at 244-45, 635 P.2d at
116. Finally, the court recognized that state regulation of speech activity may be legitimate when the activity violates free speech or property rights of others. Id. at 245, 635
P.2d at 116-17. The court opined that its approach to balancing is more advantageous for
state constitutional law-making than strict application of the federal "state action"
inquiry because the former methodology permits the court to be "more sensitive to
speech and property interests in each case and, consequently, [the court] can strike a
more just balance than that dictated by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 244, 635

242

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 8:221

Alderwood Associates presents striking evidence of a gain in
judicial sensitivity to the relevant factors for state constitutional
adjudication. The plurality's movement to the methodology of
balancing competing private claims of constitutional right was
propelled by a commendable insight that the traditional "state
action" inquiry could not be justified as a threshold barrier to
the justiciability of a cause of action against a nominally private
party under article I, section 5 and amendment 7 of the Washington Constitution. Given the immateriality of the federal constitutional objectives purportedly advanced by the fourteenth
amendment's "state action" doctrine in the context of state constitutional law declaration, the plurality aimed to unseat the
"state action" doctrine as the determinant of justiciable claims
of rights of free speech exercise raised under article I.
Unfortunately, a close reading of the opinion of the court in
Alderwood Associates may leave the reader wondering whether
the plurality's aim squarely hit the mark. Noting that "[s]ection
5 and amendment 7 could be interpreted as not requiring any
'state action,'" the Alderwood Associates court refused to take
this stance:
Although we read section 5 and amendment 7 as not requiring
the same "state action" as the Fourteenth Amendment, that
does not mean those provisions are applicable to all speech and
initiative activities. If there were no limitations to their application, every private conflict involving speech and property
Such an
rights would become a constitutional dispute ....
approach would deny private autonomy and property rights in
the same way as the "state action" requirement of the FourInstead, being
teenth Amendment denies free speech ....
sensitive to the competing speech and property rights, we conclude that section 5 and amendment 7 are applicable when,
after balancing all the interests, the balance favors the speech
and initiative activity.49
The plurality's reasoning may mean that challenged private
conduct will violate the Washington speech and initiative guarantees only if, after full consideration of the merits of competing
private claims to constitutional property and privacy rights on
the one hand and speech and initiative rights on the other, the
balance must be struck in favor of the speech and initiative
P.2d at 116.
49. Id. at 243 n.8, 635 P.2d at 116 n.8.
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activity. So understood, the plurality's balancing methodology
succeeds in eliminating "state action" as a prerequisite to a litigable cause of action under article I, section 5 and amendment 7.
It should be noted that the very first among the factors that the
plurality would propose to weigh in the balance is the "use and
nature of the private property": the strength of the privacy
expectations in the use of property is a function of its identification as a "public forum." 50 Although resembling the classical
analysis made for the "delegation" and "holding forth" rationales of the federal Theory of Identity, this examination would
reintroduce the "state action" concept, if at all, to a significantly
different end. Identification of the nature of private property
with the public forum furnishes one relevant consideration to set
off against several others in judging whether the claim to protection of speech rights will prevail on the merits. In this case, the
criterion is not determinative of a cognizable constitutional
claim of right.
A different understanding of the plurality's reasoning is
quite possible, however, if the refusal to take a jurisprudential
stance that would invite every private conflict involving speech
and property rights to become a constitutional dispute is to be
taken seriously. Although eliminating the justiciability hurdle to
a claim of right against private action under relevant provisions
of article I, the plurality's balancing methodology reasonably
may be understood to reintroduce "state action" as a discrete
and indispensable element of a cognizable cause of action. By
defining the legitimacy of the constitutional property claim in
terms of the property's functional equivalence to the public
forum, the balancing methodology drives back the essential
traditional considerations of "state action" theory as a realistically conclusive criterion in deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a constitutional claim or a motion for summary
judgment.
50. The court explained that "[wihen property is open to the public" and "becomes
the functional equivalent of a downtown area or other public forum," a reasonable exercise of speech freedoms would be less intrusive on private property rights because "the
owner has a reduced expectation of privacy and, as a corollary, any speech activity is less
threatening to the property's value." Id. at 244, 635 P.2d at 116. This, of course, is the
line of argumentation made in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1945), and Lloyd
Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 554-56 (1972), which the Alderwood Assocs. opinion cites
as support for its proposition. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 244, 635 P.2d at 116.
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "delegation" and
"holding forth" rationales in the federal Theory of Identity.
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Were this interpretation of the Alderwood Associates opinion to prevail, the plurality's enlightenment regarding the inappropriate infusion of the federal "state action" concept into the
Washington Constitution could have promised more than the
court would be willing actually to deliver. On the seismographic
scale, the early rumblings of judicial discomfort with "state
action" *parallelism would prove to be no more than a slight
tremor. The Theories of Identity and Causality would still live
on in the Washington Bill of Rights, and with fundamentally
undiluted form and function."
Such wholesale structural and substantive transference of
the federal "state action" doctrine to the Washington Bill of
Rights, however, does not appear to be compelled by explicit
commands of the state constitutional text. The article I provisions that have spawned the Washington "state action" doctrine
do not refer expressly to state governmental machinery as the
subject of their prohibitions. The guarantees of due process
rights,52 the right of petition and assemblage, 53 the right of free
speech and press,5 4 the right of personal privacy and sanctity of
the home, 55 and the right of religious conscience 51 focus clearly
only upon the beneficiaries of civil liberty protections, leaving
totally ambiguous the identity of the agents constitutionally
5
Therefore, it is as reacharged with liability for infringement7.
51. For a more recent case than Alderwood Assocs. that demonstrates the vibrancy
of the "state action" doctrine for the threshold determination of the justiciability of
claims under WASH. CONST. art. I, see In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1982).
Colyer neither mentions Alderwood Assocs. nor uses the Alderwood Assocs. balancing
approach to establish the justiciability of the art. I, § 7 privacy claim. Instead, the Colyer
court applies the standard fourteenth amendment "state action" analysis. Colyer, 99
Wash. 2d at 121, 660 P.2d at 742.
52. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3 provides: "PersonalRights. No person shall be deprived
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
53. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 4 provides: "Right of Petition and Assemblage. The right
of petition and of the people peaceably to assemble for the common good shall never be
abridged."
54. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5 provides: "Freedom of Speech. Every person may freely
speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right."
55. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 provides: "Invasion of Private Affairs or Home Prohibited. No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of law."
56. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides in pertinent part: "Religious Freedom. Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief, and worship, shall
be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or
"
property on account of religion ....
57. This ambiguity is largely a function of the grammatical structure of the art. I
guarantees. The consistent use of passive verb tenses in the commands of the provisions
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sonable to construe the language of these prohibitions on their
face as directed generally to both public and private actors as it
is to presume that these provisions apply exclusively to governmental behavior.
The total absence in these provisions of any language that
facially restricts their application to public actors stands in austere contradistinction to the text of other article I provisions
that manifestly address state officials and entities.5 8 Article I,
section 12 is the first provision within the Washington Bill of
Rights that is patently directed to state governmental machinery. Entitled "Special Privileges and Immunities Prohibited,"
section 12 states: "No law shall be passed granting to any citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges and immunities which upon the same terms shall not
equally belong to all citizens, or corporations."5' 9 Similarly, article I, section 23 undeniably refers to the Washington Legislature
in providing: "No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law
impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed." 0
Finally, article I, section 31 speaks expressly to the general state
government in mandating: "No standing army shall be kept up
by this state in time of peace.''61 A reasonable explanation for
this variance in form is that the article I provisions that do not
address state government in such specific fashions were intentionally drawn in general terms in order to apply to both public
and private actors. Without presuming want of skill or negligence in the drafting of the Bill of Rights, the proponent of the
Washington "state action" doctrine must otherwise account for
these textual distinctions and, in light of them, defend the adoption of a comprehensive "state action" requirement for the
entirety of article I as an inevitable judicial enterprise.62
obviates any explicit identification of the subjects of their dictates. For example, prototypical phrases include: "No person shall be deprived," WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3, and
"shall be guaranteed to every individual," id. § 11.
58. While there are occasional references in WASH. CONST. art. I to "authority of
law," see, e.g., id. § 3 (no deprivation of life, liberty, or property "without due process of
law"); id. § 7 (no invasion of private affairs or home "without authority of law"),
whatever emphasis is placed upon such qualifiers for support of a "state action" restriction in the prohibitions is totally misdirected. When the nature of the constitutional
constraint is the extension of protection under the "law of the land," there is no necessary determination made as to the targets of the command.
59. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 12.
60. WASH. CONsT. art. I, § 23.
61. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 31.
62. The author recognizes that this argument for constitutional construction was
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Similarly, fourteenth amendment "state action" parallelism
in the Washington Constitution was not compelled by a comparison of the relevant federal and state constitutional texts.6 3 In
contrast to those article I provisions that are not limited in
raised by Chief Justice Marshall in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 248
(1833) (fifth amendment to the federal constitution does not restrain state legislative
power), and rejected in the Court's conclusion that the subject-nonspecific prohibitions
of the federal Bill of Rights must be understood as applicable only to the national government. For support, Marshall relied upon a textual construction of the restraints on
legislative power contained in art. I, § 9 clauses, which use language explicitly addressing
Congress, and other clauses that are expressed in general terms. Despite the variation in
form, Marshall established that the entire section is directed solely to the national government, given the express limitations upon state legislatures contained in the subsequent provision, art. I, § 10. By analogy, therefore, the general terms of the Bill of Rights
apply only to the powers of the general government, since restrictions of state governmental action similarly would be presented in specific terms.
Without disputing the inherent logic of Marshall's reasoning, see, e.g., 2 W. CRossKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1049-82
(1953), one can safely assert the limited claim that the textual disparity between the
explicit restriction of the first amendment to Congress and the general prohibitions on
governmental power in the remainder of the first eight amendments could rationally support the converse of Marshall's facial construction of the Bill of Rights. Id. at 1056-58.
No stronger position than this is argued with respect to art. I of the Washington Constitution. Moreover, it is clear that Marshall's interpretation of the general letter of the
first ten amendments responded to the Court's understanding that the substance and
spirit of the original federal Constitution were focused upon the creation of powers in a
national government and the establishment of restraints upon the powers conferred.
Barron, 32 U.S. at 247 ("The powers they conferred on this government were to be exercised by itself; and the limitations on power, if expressed in general terms, are naturally,
and, we think, necessarily applicable to the government created by the instrument.").
This Article proposes that sound reasons exist to reject such a narrow perspective for the
substance and spirit of the Washington Constitution. See infra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
63. The text criticizes "state action" parallelism in the Washington Bill of Rights by
comparison to the fourteenth amendment. A counterargument may explain such parallelism by comparison, rather, to the second through eighth amendments in the federal Bill
of Rights, the general language of which has been held to apply only to national governmental behavior. See supra note 62. Recognizing that the superior relevance of textual
comparison cannot be determined in any conclusive manner, two reasons may be offered
to justify a preference for linguistic cross-reference to the fourteenth amendment. First,
the Washington "state action" concept was developed by conscious incorporation of fourteenth amendment jurisprudence, and the necessity for this transfer is more appropriately judged by the similarity of the terms of the "source" and "recipient" documents.
Second, textual comparison to the original Bill of Rights may be inappropriate if any
credence can be placed in the characterization of the political concerns underlying their
framing given by the Barron Court that first established their limitation only to federal
governmental action. Chief Justice Marshall argued that the Constitution and its first
ten amendments were conceived primarily to delineate the boundaries of general governmental power vis-A-vis state sovereignty. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247
(1833). There is no suggestion that the issue of federal justiciability of causes of action
between private parties under the original federal Bill of Rights was ever contemplated,
much less disposed of, by the drafters.
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explicit terms to state governmental actions, section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution specifically restricts only state infringement of individual liberties
guaranteed therein. 4 Apparently, the plurality opinion of the
court in Alderwood Associates found this argument to be compelling in eliminating the "state action" requirement for justiciability of a claim of right against private parties under the
state constitutional speech and initiative guarantees. Establishing that "our speech and initiative provisions do not expressly
mention 'state action,' "6 the plurality opinion recognizes that
the "state action" analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment is
required by the language of the federal, but not the state constitution: "We have held in other contexts that where our constitutional provision is linguistically different from its parallel in the
federal constitution, we are not bound to treat the state and federal constitutions as coextensive." 66
Moreover, the transplantation of the federal "state action"
doctrine into article I does not appear to be compelled by the
substance and the spirit of the document that emerged from the
Washington constitutional convention of 1889. The fourteenth
amendment "state action" doctrine attempts to maintain a
coherent distinction between the realm of affirmative public governance and that of private exercise of liberty, the former alone
the proper subject of federal judicial review. It is difficult to presume, however, that the Washington Constitution as a whole
reinforces the same dichotomy between constitutionally justiciable public action and constitutionally nonjusticiable private
action.
In substantial part, the text of the Washington Constitution
64. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
65. Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 243, 635 P.2d at 116.
66. Id. The Alderwood Assocs. plurality relied expressly upon the decisions of the
New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980), and of
the California Supreme Court in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899,
592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979), which construed their respective state constitutional speech guarantees to reject the "state action" requirement of the fourteenth
amendment. The plurality opinion states: "we choose to follow the approach of Schmid
and Robins which recognizes that the 'state action' analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment is required by the language of the federal, but not the state, constitution." Alderwood Assocs., 96 Wash. 2d at 243, 635 P.2d at 116.
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expressly grants jurisdiction to the state courts to protect private economic, political, and civil liberty interests against
abridgment by other private individuals or entities. Numerous
provisions of article XII impose a battery of direct restrictions
upon nonmunicipal corporate governance, many of which pertain particularly to the private banking and transportation
industries. 7 Article I, section 16, entitled "Eminent Domain,"
prohibits the taking or damaging of real property for public or
private use without just compensation;6 8 as interpreted by the
Washington courts, "[t]hat constitutional right, together with its
corresponding responsibility, exists between two contesting private parties." 9 Although addressing the state legislature, article
II, section 28 mandates regulatory policy with regard to eighteen
enumerated subject matters, several of which concern personal
interactions between private individuals or entities.7 0 That the
67. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 4 (limited stockholder liabilities); id. § 6 (limitations upon issuance of stock); id. § 8 (alienation of franchise not to release liabilities);
id. § 13 (regulation of common carriers); id. § 15 (prohibition of discriminatory charges
or grant of facilities for transportation); id. § 18 (legislative power to set reasonable
transportation rates); id. § 19 (regulation of telegraph and telephone companies); id. § 22
(anti-monopoly and anti-trust provisions).
68. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16.
69. Bay v. Hein, 9 Wash. App. 774, 776, 515 P.2d 536, 538 (1973). The Washington
appellate court recognized that a property owner's right to lateral support from an
adjoining landowner is founded not merely upon Washington common law, but also upon
the guarantees of art. I, § 16 of the Washington State Constitution. In pertinent part,
that section provides: "No private property shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having been first made." The court observed that the
guarantees of art. I, § 16 apply as against both public and private abridgment. Bay, 9
Wash. App. at 776, 515 P.2d at 538. In support for this proposition, the Bay opinion
cited Kelley v. Falangus, 63 Wash. 2d 581, 388 P.2d 223 (1964) (private landowners may
not escape responsibility for lateral support imposed by art. I, § 16 by delegation to
private independent contractor the constitutional duty to avoid injury to adjoining private property). The Washington Supreme Court in Kelley relied upon its prior rulings in
Hummel v. Peterson, 69 Wash. 143, 124 P. 400 (1912), and Knapp v. Siegley, 120 Wash.
478, 208 P. 13 (1922), to establish that the art. I, § 16 right of lateral support runs
against private parties. 63 Wash. 2d at 584 n.2, 388 P.2d at 224 n.2.
70. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 28 prohibits the legislature from enacting any special or
private laws in such particularized regulatory concerns as: changing the names of persons
or constituting one person the heir at law of another, id. § 28, cl.1; authorizing the sale
or mortgage of real or personal property of minors or other legally incapacitated persons,
id. § 28, cf. 4; and giving legal effect to invalid deeds, wills, or other instruments, id. § 28,
cl.9.
Reference to these clauses of art. II, § 28 may be made to support the propriety of
federal "state action" parallelism in art. I. It may be argued that, contrary to the position articulated in the text regarding the "substance and spirit" of the Washington Constitution, the provision recognizes that state government has unique power over individuals, and it is precisely this power that the document was tailored to control. The author
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state judiciary may enforce these constitutional provisions governing purely private behavior" may not definitively establish
justiciability to protect the individual liberties granted in article
I against private injury. Such evidence of constitutional governance of private conduct, however, rebuts the proposition that
the Washington Constitution is a document speaking solely to
72
behavior of state governmental officers and institutions. Ultiagrees with this alternative reading of § 28 to the following degree: recognizing the broad
power vested in the legislature to regulate private affairs, this provision constitutionalizes specific statutory objectives to remove them from the realm of legislative discretion.
See infra note 72. The author disagrees with the sentiment and conclusion of the alternative reading, however: it is not apparent that, by tailoring certain regulatory power of
the state legislature, § 28 recognizes the governmental authority to control private affairs
as "unique" to the state legislature, and such a conclusion does not follow inexorably
from the function of § 28. The very presence of judicially enforceable constitutional
restraints expressly directed to private conduct challenges the tenability of the alternative reading. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
71. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 29 ensures a cause of action for most constitutional
prohibitions expressly directed to private conduct in the absence of state legislation
granting state court jurisdiction in cases arising under these provisions. Entitled "Constitution Mandatory," § 29 states: "The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory,
unless by express words they are declared to be otherwise." The clauses of art. XII regulating private corporate behavior, see supra note 67 and accompanying text, and art. I, §
16 make no such explicit requirement of substantive enforceability by legislative enactment, except art. XII, §§ 11, 13, 18, 19, 20, and 22.
72. Whatever reliable evidence may be mustered to substantiate the collective purposes of the delegates to the 1889 convention, that which exists supports the position
that federal "state action" parallelism in art. I does not appear to be compelled by
"framers' intent." Although the transcripts and notes of speeches given by and debates
held among the delegates have been destroyed, the remaining sources for such testimony,
including newspaper accounts of the proceedings and the journal of the Washington
State Constitutional Convention, are all competently paraphrased and evaluated in D.
JOHANSEN & C. GATES, EMPIRE OF THE COLUMBIA: A HISTORY OF THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST

(1957), and W. Airey, A History of the Constitution and Government of Washington
Territory (1945) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis available in Washington State Library, Olympia). See also THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
1889 (B. Rosenow ed. 1962).
Reportedly, the press and public generally perceived that the original document
functioned as a statute, going far beyond the prototypically open-ended provisions of the
federal Constitution, by incorporating the minutiae of regulation of important private
interactions. One of the most controversial features of the Washington Constitution at
the time of its adoption, apparently, was its length. See Stiles, The Constitution of the
State of Washington and Its Effect upon Public Interests, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 281, 281
(1913); Airey, supra this note, at 451 & n.3. Critics characterized the Washington Constitution as "more of a law code than a constitution." Id. at 451 & n.2. See also Knapp, The
Origin of the Constitution of the State of Washington, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 227, 230 (1913).
The efforts of the convention to incorporate crucial substantive regulation of private
transactions into constitutional provisions have been explained as a function of the delegates' distrust of a corruptible legislature, often articulated openly in debate. See D.
JOHANSEN & C. GATES, supra this note, at 410 ("The legislature was particularly the
target of constitutional restraint . . . .As one of the delegates remarked, 'If. . .a stran-
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mately, the rebuttal weakens the viability of the argument that,
situated in such a constitution, article I should be read as speaking solely to state governmental behavior.
IV.

FUNCTIONS OF THE FEDERAL "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE

To determine whether the Washington Constitution's incorporation of federal "state action" is justifiable, it is essential first
to understand the conceivable purposes for creation and maintenance of the doctrine in the fourteenth amendment of the
United States Constitution. Only by reference to the functions
theoretically served by the federal "state action" requirement is
it possible to consider a charge that the concept is irrelevant and
unequal to meaningful state constitutional law declaration. Brief
attention must be given, therefore, to the values promoted by
the federal Theories of Identity and Causality, whether traditionally recognized in decisional law or abstracted from the doctrine's relationship to the tenets of legal liberalism.
Two major instrumental values are advanced by the "state
action" doctrine that relate to issues of the justiciability of the
federal courts. First, it is a long-established perception that the
"state action" threshold of a litigable fourteenth amendment
claim preserves the essential role of state government in the federalist system. By promoting redress only against "state action"
adverse to the rights secured by the fourteenth amendment, the
doctrine guarantees the independent police power of state government to regulate private civil liberties. In its first major pronouncement on Congress' power to enforce the substantive provisions of the fourteenth amendment, the United States
Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases characterized the
''state action" doctrine as delimiting the proper scope of federal
authority. Such authority comprehended "not general legislation
upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is,
such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting. . . such
acts and proceedings as the States may commit or take, and
which, by the Amendment, they are prohibited from committing
or taking. ' 73 The opinion explained:
ger from a foreign country were to drop into this convention, he would conclude that we
were fighting a great enemy, and that this enemy is the legislature.' "); Stiles, supra this
note, at 281 (in enacting a new constitution, the delegates insisted upon withdrawing
certain questions of private concerns from possible legislative disturbances).
73. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883).
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Such legislation cannot properly cover the whole domain of
rights appertaining to life, liberty and property, defining them
and providing for their vindication. That would be to establish
a code of municipal law regulative of all private rights between
man and man in society. It would be to make Congress take
7
the place of the State Legislatures and to supersede them. 4

Underlying the evolution of the federal "state action" doctrine,
therefore, is the judicial recognition that application of fourteenth amendment dictates to purely private action might supplant the states' positive law governing socio-economic relations
among individuals and threaten the traditional realm of state
police power to regulate private civil rights.7 5 Second, the federal
"state action" doctrine may be explained as furthering another,
distinct instrumental purpose: it aims to secure the constitutional separation of powers among national governmental actors.
Under this view, the "state action" inquiry derives from, and
responds to, federal judicial concerns as to the courts' proper
institutional role vis-A-vis the legislative and executive departments in the supervision of state-regulated individual liberties.
Seeking to prevent the federal judiciary from becoming a
"super-legislature," the doctrine reserves to the political
processes important governmental decisions to expand federal
protection of substantive constitutional rights against private
infringement.76 Such institutional "angst" might be attributed to
a confluence of constitutional doctrinal and jurisprudential
developments. Recently, congressional authority to reach private
violations of civil liberties under the commerce and spending
74. Id. at 13. Recent United States Supreme Court commentary reinforces its original perspective that the primary instrumental purpose of the "state action" doctrine is
"to require the [federal] courts to respect the limits of their own power as directed
against state governments and private interests." Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922, 936-37 (1982).
75. Academic commentators generally perceive the fourteenth amendment "state
action" doctrine to serve instrumentally to buttress federalism. See, e.g., Burke & Reber,
State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditors' Rights: An Essay on the Fourteenth
Amendment, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1014-16 (1973); Henkin, supra note 1, at 475.
76. Several scholars have emphasized the "political process" rationale for the fourteenth amendment "state action" doctrine. See, e.g., Burke & Reber, supra note 75, at
1017-18 (federal judiciary's restriction of further developments in fourteenth amendment
substantive doctrine in favor of deference to congressional power to evolve legislative
solutions); Goodman, Professor Brest on State Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor Stone, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1331, 1336 (1982) ("basic philosophy" of
"state action" doctrine that conflicting interests of nongovernmental actors should be
resolved through democratic political process rather than through judicial application of
the fourteenth amendment).
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powers and under the enabling provisions of the Civil War
amendments has been expanded vastly. 77 Furthermore, the separation of powers rationale may be buttressed by the contemporary school of legal thought that denies to the least politically
accountable branch any major governmental responsibility for
formulating social policy decisions.78
77. For the doctrinal evolution of congressional authority to regulate private civil
rights violations: (1) under the interstate commerce power, see Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (Congress may, pursuant to its power under commerce clause,
prohibit discrimination in private restaurants that offer to serve interstate travelers or
that serve food of which a substantial portion has moved in interstate commerce); Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (under the authority of
commerce clause, Congress may legislate against racial discrimination in places of public
accommodation even if the lodging is purely local in character and privately owned and
operated); (2) under the spending power, see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568 (1974)
(pursuant to its spending powers, Congress may prohibit discrimination on the basis of
race or national origin in private school programs that are federally subsidized when the
children discriminated against are thereby precluded from effective participation in the
school district's educational programs); (3) under U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2, see
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 438-39 (1968) (Congress may, under the
authority granted it by § 2 of the thirteenth amendment, prohibit discrimination in the
purely private sale of housing, the restraint of the right to purchase property being a
badge or incident of slavery); (4) under U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, see Katzenbach v.
Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (Congress may, under the authority granted by § 5 of
the fourteenth amendment, enact legislation to secure the right to vote for non-English
speaking persons who were educated in American schools); United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745, 755 (1966) (§ 5 of the fourteenth amendment empowers Congress to enact
criminal laws to punish conspiracies among private actors that interfere with rights protected under § 1); and (5) under U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2, see City of Rome v. United
States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) (pursuant to the powers granted by § 2 of the fifteenth
amendment, Congress may prohibit voting practices that may have racially discriminatory impacts even if the discrimination is unintentional); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966) (pursuant to § 2 of the fifteenth amendment, Congress may
remedy racial discrimination in voting by suspending literacy and other voting tests, and
by imposition of various restrictions in state voting regulations).
It is significant to note that the doctrine developed to implement the Civil War
amendments approves congressional legislation reaching private conduct and preventing
potential future civil rights violations by state or nonstate actors. The Court has long
acknowledged congressional power to secure against private interference a limited category of constitutional rights arising from the relationship of the individual to the federal
government. See United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 81-82 (1951) (18 U.S.C. § 241
(1979) protects against private conduct that interferes with rights arising from substantive powers of the federal government).
78. For widely celebrated writings within the American jurisprudential school of
"process-oriented" restrictions on the power of federal judicial review, see generally J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980); H. WECHSLER, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, in PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3, 27 (1961); Bork Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). Persuasive
critiques of the "process-oriented" theorists are launched in Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory-and its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223 (1981), and Tribe, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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Apart from these instrumental rationales, the federal "state
action" doctrine theoretically may promote a normative purpose:
ensuring the philosophic rationality and pragmatic operability of
legal liberalism. Prior discussion established the logical connection between the doctrine's Theories of Identity and Causality
and the classical distinction of "self-regarding" and "otherregarding" conduct offered to reconcile the conflicting tenets of
legal liberalism.7 9 This relationship suggests that the "state
action" doctrine may operate as a convenient jurisprudential
tool to satisfy the line-drawing requirement of legal liberalism.
The doctrine may control the judicial task of delineating the
points at which the presumption of liberty wanes and the presumption of security waxes, or vice versa. By facilitating resolution of the tension between the goals of liberty and security of
right, the "state action" doctrine may reinforce the viability of
legal liberalism.
The function of "state action" as a line-drawing device is
highlighted in the substantive doctrine of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution. The fourteenth amendment is the source of substantive rights to life (to be), to liberty
(to do), to property (to have), and to equal protection of the
laws (equally) against deprivation or denial by a state. As understood, the fourteenth amendment due process and equal protection doctrines promote the premise of security of right, granting
federal judicial access to individual claims of right to be free
from external infringements upon substantive freedoms to be, to
do, and to have equally. The premise of security of right is promoted, however, only to the extent of the lines drawn by the
"state action" doctrine; beyond those lines, the premise of liberty prevails, recognizing the power of private individuals to
affect, or even injure, the claimant's substantive freedoms to be,
to do, and to have equally.
Therefore, the Theories of Identity and Causality delimit a
justiciable constitutional claim to security of right. The extent of
the "identity" of the "state" places limits on the persons or entities that may be charged under a claim to security of right. The
scope of the concept of "deprivation" or "denial" defines the
pre-existing duty owed by the "state" as the "duty not to act" so
as to infringe unduly these substantive interests claimed, and
thereby places boundaries upon the types of activity that can be
79. See supra text § II.
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said to have "caused" the injury complained of. Together, the
Theories of Identity and Causality ensure that the premise of
security of right and the correlative right of access to the federal
judiciary control for a category of activity that, in terms of legal
liberal philosophy, is clearly "other-regarding"; whereas the premise of liberty and the correlative freedom from federal judicial
interference control for other activities presumed "private" or
"self-regarding."
V.

INSTRUMENTAL AND NORMATIVE FUNCTIONALITY OF THE

"STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE IN THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION

In light of the theoretical purposes for the federal "state
action" doctrine, adoption of its identical counterpart in the
Washington Constitution defies rational analysis. The Washington "state action" doctrirde cannot be justified in terms of the
instrumental rationales for the fourteenth amendment concept.
The federalism and separation of powers considerations arguably appropriate to determinations of federal judicial selfrestraint bear little, if any, relevance to the institutional competence of the Washington State courts. Neither can the substantive parallelism in the federal and Washington "state action"
doctrines be justified for the normative purpose of reinforcing
the operability of legal liberalism. The federal "state action"
80. Theoretically, it may be possible to explain the Washington "state action" doctrine as serving objectives different from those justifying the federal constitutional doctrine. Nothing in the history of the doctrine's evolution in art. I or in the nature of the
doctrine itself, however, either identifies such objectives or suggests their existence.
Rather, the Washington Supreme Court's adoption of the federal "state action" doctrine
in a conscious effort to construe federal and state personal liberty guarantees as substantively identical (chronicled in section III of this Article) argues strongly against separate
and distinct jurisprudential rationales for the Washington "state action" concept. Moreover, the indistinguishable form and content of the federal and state constitutional Theories of Identity and Causality challenge the credulity of any claim as to distinguishable
operation or function.
Were the Washington "state action" doctrine demonstrated to respond to unique
concerns not discussed in this section, such objectives are likely subsumed under the
umbrella normative purpose of reconciling the conflicting tenets of legal liberalism. See
supra note 79 and accompanying text. Alternative explanations for the federal and state
constitutional "state action" doctrine may offer philosophical, political, or socio-economic reasons for which the "state action" concept operates as a line-drawing device
between the realms of private and public action. For example, the doctrine may be
viewed as serving a liberal philosophical purpose: recognizing the duties incumbent upon
the state as the "trustee" of public power, the "state action" doctrine reflects the more
odious nature of injury to constitutional interests inflicted by governmental bodies or
officials than by private parties. Also, the doctrine may be perceived to mirror a distinction in economic theory between the real-world power of private actors in competitive
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doctrine itself suffers from a lack of operational content s '
because the Theories of Identity and Causality can provide only
indeterminate and arbitrary guidelines by which to distinguish
discrete and separable spheres of "public" (that is, "other82
regarding") and "private" (that is, "self-regarding") activity.
Derivatively, the Washington "state action" doctrine faces the
same operative dysfunctionality. Moreover, the justiciability
requirement of "state action" in the Washington Constitution
produces normatively inapposite results, since the premise of
security of right is violated to the same degree whether "private" or "state" entities act directly and purposefully to deprive
the claimant of an interest alleged to be secure as of right. Thus,
the "state action" doctrine cannot function to balance the conflicting tenets of legal liberalism in any meaningful or just
fashion.
and monopolistic markets by recognizing the government's unique capacity to affect
human behavior due to its legally enforceable monopoly power. Such alternative explanations may provide reasonable justifications for understanding the substantive content
of certain fundamental liberties in a particular manner and, consequently, for drawing
the lines between the realms of private action (or the presumption of liberty) and public
action (or the presumption of security of right) in a particular place. These explanations
do implicitly assume, however, that the lines drawn will not violate the central tenets of
legal liberalism. In short, any alternative justification for the "state action" doctrine consistent with liberal legal theory will reflect, at a minimum, the "negative purpose" of not
infringing or not compromising the presumptions of liberty or security of right; thereby,
however indirectly, such a justification promotes a resolution of legal liberalism's goals in
tension.
81. "Lack of operational content" connotes that the "state action" doctrine does not
easily allow "real-world particulars" to be accounted for by its theoretical directives,
because the parameters and content of the doctrine do not classify empirical entities in
any determinate manner. This concept is treated among many others in a taxonomy of
prototypical reasoning errors found in American legal argumentation, collaboratively
authored by Professor Pierre Schlag of the University of Puget Sound Law School and
myself, which is soon to be published but currently on file with the University of Puget
Sound Law Review. For the distinction between "normative significance" and "operational significance" that underlies the concept of "lack of operational content," see
Schlag, An Attack on CategoricalApproaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV.
671, 698 (1983).
82. The terms "public" and "private" are used throughout section V of this Article
in the same sense in which the words were employed in section II, which introduced the
"public-private" distinction in the federal constitutional "state action" doctrine as a
function of the "other-regarding/self-regarding" dichotomy in liberal legal theory. See
supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text. "Public action" refers to the totality of the
conduct of governmental institutions, officers, and agents, categorically defined as
"other-regarding," and "private action" refers to all other conduct that cannot reasonably be attributed to governmental institutions, officers, and agents. It is this understanding of "public" and "private" that promotes the normative rationale of the federal "state
action" doctrine as a line-drawing device for liberal jurisprudence.
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In the context of Washington constitutional adjudication,
the "state action" doctrine's federalism rationale is the most displaced. Whereas the fourteenth amendment's jurisdictional prerequisite may be construed as preserving the traditional and
independent police power of separate state sovereignty in the
federal system,8 3 no such rationalization can be offered for the
"state action" requirement in article I of the Washington Constitution. Although the Washington Constitution mandates the
establishment of a system of county government 4 and the creation and organization of municipal corporations by general state
legislation,85 the constitution neither recognizes these legal subdivisions as coordinate sovereigns with the state nor guarantees
attributes of governing authority that may not be impaired by
state regulation." Since the Washington Constitution denies any
essential governmental autonomy to subordinate political units,
its "state action" doctrine cannot appropriately be vindicated as
83. See supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Apart from imputing a federalism safeguard to the fourteenth amendment, the United States Supreme Court has
determined that the tenth amendment to the Constitution recognizes and guarantees the
essential integrity and effective governing role of the states in the federalist system.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (1974 amendment to the
Fair Labor Standards Act, imposing wage and hours regulations for state governmental
employees, held invalid under tenth amendment). But see Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769-70 (1982), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 290-91 (1981), which effectively place limitations
upon the National League of Cities doctrine in attempts to distinguish it.
84. See WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (delimiting the establishment of new counties); id.
§ 4 (requiring state legislature to establish a uniform system of county government and
to provide for township organization); id. § 5 (requiring state legislature to provide by
general laws for the election and compensation of county officers, and to describe their
duties).
85. See WASH. CONST. art. XII, § 10 (requiring state legislature to provide for
municipal incorporation by general laws); id. § 16 (permitting formulation of combined
"city-county" corporations, but requiring no legislative authorization).
86. WASH. CONST. art. XI, § 11, the sole provision of the Washington Constitution
that directly addresses the legislative capacity of the state's political subdivisions, explicitly denies any independent realm of regulatory authority that may not be superseded by
state legislation or totally preempted by state governmental occupation of the field. See
King County Council v. Public Disclosure Comm'n, 93 Wash. 2d 559, 562-63, 611 P.2d
1227, 1229 (1980) (charter county has as broad legislative powers as state except when
limited by enactments of state legislature); Standow v. City of Spokane, 88 Wash. 2d
624, 633-34, 564 P.2d 1145, 1151 (1977) (power of municipalities to enact licensing ordinance may be abridged by state legislature); City of Union Gap v. Carey, 64 Wash. 2d 43,
46, 390 P.2d 674, 675 (1964) (city has right to regulate broad legislative areas so long as
no conflict with state enactments or apparent attempt of state legislature to occupy the
field); Gunther v. Huneke, 58 Wash. 494, 496-97, 108 P. 1078, 1079-80 (1910) (WASH.
CONST. art. XI, §§ 4, 11 subject townships, cities, and counties to state law, and management of their business is under control of the legislature).
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safeguarding a variation of federalism. 7
Similarly, the second instrumental purpose for the federal
"state action" doctrine, maintaining a separation of powers in
the national regulation of civil liberties, is inappropriate to state
constitutional lawmaking. Considerations pertinent to the
proper role of the judiciary in the tripartite division of federal
powers are largely inconsequential to the potential function of
the Washington courts in the evolution of individual rights
guarantees.
Whereas primary responsibility for development of federal
civil rights policy may be denied to the judiciary as the sole
politically unaccountable branch of government, the justices of
the Washington Supreme Court and the judges of the state
inferior courts are elected officials,"8 and theoretically they may
be held responsible by the electorate for their decisions in adjudication. The voter's capacity to select state judicial candidates
on their merits, or to register approval or disapproval of an
incumbent's performance by re-election or replacement, must be
assumed to be equivalent to the voter's capacity to elect other
governmental officials. Therefore, there is arguably nothing more
"counter-majoritarian" in the judicial invalidation of state legislation than in the gubernatorial veto of legislation passed by the
state assembly. 9 The political viability of any ruling is likely to
87. The federalist system places limitations upon state courts to interpret and
enforce the civil liberty guarantees accorded by its own positive law, of course, in that
protection of interests secured by state law may not impair federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (California
may exercise its sovereign right to adopt more expansive individual liberties under its
constitution than those conferred by federal Constitution, resulting in free expression
rights for students soliciting signatures for a political initiative in a private shopping
mall). The Court in Pruneyardwas careful to observe, however, that "[it is, of course,
well established that a State in the exercise of its police power may adopt reasonable
restrictions on private property so long as the restrictions do not amount to a taking
without just compensation or contravene any other federal constitutional provision." Id.
at 81. This aspect of federalism restrains state judiciaries in their "line-drawing function" between conflicting claims of right.
Federalism constraints in the balance struck between federal and state guaranteed
liberties are distinct, however, from the federalism controls theoretically served by the
"state action" doctrine. The federalism concern of "state action" does not address how a
balance between substantive guarantees is to be struck, but whether the balance may be
struck at all. Thus, the relevant issue is the constitutional and prudential competence of
the federal or state court in view of the respect due to a coordinate sovereignty.
88. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, §§ 3, 5 (providing for election of judges to the state
supreme and superior courts).
89. See WASH. CONST. art. III, § 12. For an opposing position, see Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873,
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be reflected in state judicial review, and the force of precedential
inhibition to future modifications of conauthority a less salient
0
9
stitutional holdings.

Moreover, the current doctrinal reservation of the federal
regulation of individual liberties to the political branches does
not characterize the role of the Washington courts in the creation and enforcement of private rights. Traditionally, state
courts have defined civil liberties by common and constitutional
decisional law. Of course, the judicial balance of competing
claims of right, when articulated in common-law decisions, is
subject to direct state legislative alteration. Such judicial balancing by constitutional ruling, however, is not immune from future
political modification by positive enactments securing certain
legal entitlements. State courts may understand the legislative
protection of certain liberty interests to place more decisive
weight in favor of claims to security of these interests when once
again examined in the balance.9 1 Furthermore, the amendment
941 (1976) (judicial review, even when exercised by elected judges, is never without antidemocratic flavor).
90. Properly understood, the separation of powers rationale for the federal and state
constitutional "state action" doctrines responds to the jurisprudential concern for the
constitutional competence of the judiciary in a majoritarian democratic system of governance. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. This concern is distinct from,
albeit related to, the functional issues of the institutional capacity of the judiciary to
perform factfinding or policy decision-making suitable to a legislative or administrative
body, or to develop manageable standards or criteria sufficient to resolve a particular
case. In the context of federal constitutional law, these functional issues are central considerations of the "political question" doctrine. See, e.g., Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1,
10 (1973) (challenge to training of Ohio National Guard held to present nonjusticiable
issues under the fourteenth amendment due process clause); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,
237 (1962) (challenge to Tennessee legislative apportionment scheme held to be a justiciable cause of action under the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause).
Apparently, the Washington Supreme Court has not followed federal precedent by
developing an insular "political question" doctrine to define the institutional powers of
the state courts under the Washington Constitution. Functional considerations similar to
those accounted for under the federal "political question" doctrine, however, lie at the
core of Washington Supreme Court decisions defining the scope of judicial review in
economic substantive due process matters. See, e.g., Oil Heat Inst. v. Town of Mukilteo,
81 Wash. 2d 7, 11, 498 P.2d 864, 867 (1972) (tax); State ex rel. York v. Board of
Comm'rs, 28 Wash. 2d 891, 904-05, 184 P.2d 577, 585 (1947) (issuance of franchise to
electrical company); Bates v. McLeod, 11 Wash. 2d 648, 654-55, 120 P.2d 472, 475-76
(1941) (tax). In these cases, the Washington Supreme Court has recognized that the judiciary must defer to socio-economic policy choices of state and local legislative bodies
when the choices involve political issues that the state courts are not capable institutionally to resolve. Therefore, the Washington courts are fully equipped doctrinally to
respond to the functional concerns of judicial power without relying on the "state
action" concept at all.
91. Naturally, the judicial inquiry limiting this potential for future legislative influ-

1985]

Washington "State Action" Doctrine

process reversing politically intolerable judicial constitutional
interpretations is more accessible under the Washington Constitution than under the federal scheme. 2
In addition to these distinctions in the institutional characters of the federal and Washington judiciaries, the function of
Washington's "state action" doctrine in preserving a division of
state governmental power in the regulation of private rights is
highly questionable 3 Were the "state action" doctrine totally
abandoned, any perceptible judicial restriction of the legislative
police power would be less a function of the state courts' greater
constitutional justiciability than a function of the degree of deference accorded in constitutional adjudication to legislative
delineations of private right. The rigor given to substantive
rationality review of state legislation regulating private transactions, although crucial to separation of powers considerations, is
not controlled by the "state action" doctrine. The breadth of
constitutional justiciability in cases of purely private behavior
does not compel the adoption of any particular standard for substantive review.
Unlike the instrumental rationales for the federal "state
action" doctrine, its normative rationale may be relevant to conence is whether the legislative reordering or prioritization of competing private interests
debases the disfavored interest below the floor of constitutional protection established by
the courts' prior decisions.
92. Textual comparison of the federal and state constitutional amendment procedures exposes the vast differences in political logistics necessary for the two operations.
Amendment of the Washington Constitution requires a two-thirds vote of each branch of
the state legislature and approval by a majority of the electorate at the next general
election. WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, § 1. Article V of the United States Constitution, on
the other hand, requires not only a two-thirds vote of both houses of Congress or a
request for a constitutional convention by two-thirds of the state legislatures, but also
requires ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures or three-fourths of the convention delegates. U.S. CONST. art. V. In addition to considerations of process, it is far
more likely that political consensus may be reached among a relatively homogeneous
population in one state than in the federal union of states, thus facilitating the alteration
of the state constitution in the wake of a highly unpopular judicial interpretation. General observations regarding the fairly effective means of subjecting state constitutions to
the popular will are made in Note, Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State
Bills of Rights, 8 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 271, 295-96 (1973), and Developments in the
Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1324, 135055 (1982).
93. The concern that the demise of "state action" in state constitutional law might
shift the balance of the police regulatory power from state legislatures to state courts,
effected by state constitutional decision-making respecting legal disputes of private parties, is made in Deukmejian & Thompson, All Sail and No Anchor-JudicialReview
Under the California Constitution, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 975, 999-1006 (1979).
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stitutional adjudication in Washington State's liberal legal system. The reason that the normative function for the federal
"state action" doctrine cannot justify its incorporation within
the Washington Constitution is that, simply, it does not work.
The federal "state action" doctrine is capable of providing only
arbitrary and indeterminate guidelines for delineating the judicially cognizable realm of public action from the judicially
noncognizable realm of private interactions. As inherently arbitrary, the "state action" doctrine cannot resolve the line-drawing
problem of legal liberalism; it cannot serve meaningfully, at the
threshold determination of justiciability, to distinguish cases
controlled by the premise of liberty from cases controlled by the
premise of security of right.
In all permutations, the "status relationships" between state
and private actor discoverable under the federal Theory of Identity are contingent upon two presuppositions that expose the
theory's essential arbitrariness. First, the private party charged
with injury has operated in an area in which government previously or simultaneously intervened to order a multitude of
dimensions and terms of social relations or transactions. Second,
the private party charged with injury has assumed authority,
prerogatives, or capabilities for action that government previously had exercised and might be deemed to have delegated
away overtly or covertly, or in which government acquiesced but
legitimately might have demanded to exercise in full. 4
The first presupposition cannot rationally classify the universe of human affairs into mutually exclusive public and private spheres of action since, for better or for worse, government
is intimately involved in the regulation of almost every facet of
interpersonal relations. Since the evolution of the post-World
War II American administrative state,9 5 there are few forms of
94. These two presuppositions inhere in the fourteenth amendment "state action"
decisions prior to 1974, albeit generally in implicit form. It is obvious that the categories
of "undertaking" rationales (whether by "delegation" or "holding forth") and "entwinement" rationales (including "nexus" and "joint action") characteristically rely upon
these underlying conditions to establish a sufficient "status relationship" between the
state and the injuring party. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (taxonomy of
Theory of Identity). More recent decisional law elevates the extremities of these two
presuppositions to the level of determinative criteria for a finding of "state action":
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157, 160-61 (1978), and Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974), require that the private actor operate within a
realm of authority traditionally and exclusively reserved to the state.
95. In Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952), Mr. Justice
Jackson commented on the extensive administrative interposition in ordinary social deal-
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social interaction in
have not intervened,
duct directly or to
whereby individuals

which the federal and state governments
separately or jointly, to order private concurb, control, or influence the processes
order their ordinary affairs.96 Given that

ings as a judicially noticeable fact: "The rise of administrative bodies probably has been
the most significant legal trend of the last century and perhaps more values today are
affected by their decisions than by those of all the courts, review of administrative decisions apart." Id. at 487 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
96. See 1 C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.02, at 7 (1st ed. 1958) for a remarkable
list of the plethora of federal regulatory concerns substantiating the author's assertion
that "the administrative process affects nearly everyone in many ways nearly every day."
During consideration of S. 1080, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (Regulatory Reform
Act to amend the Administrative Procedure Act requiring federal agencies to analyze the
cost-effectiveness of rules and regulations), which passed the Senate but was never
enacted into law, the accompanying Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
published evidence of the tremendous growth in and pervasive economic and social
effects of federal administrative regulation. Whereas in 1965, 8.2% of the American gross
national product was beholden to federal regulatory controls, by 1975 that figure had
risen to 23.7%; from 1970 to 1979 alone, eight new federal regulatory agencies had been
created and 80 major regulatory statutes enacted. S. REP. No. 284, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
9-10 (1981).
The fact that S. 1080 was sponsored by 81 Democratic and Republican senators
itself indicates a unity of opinion within the major American political parties that federal
regulation permeates, and often burdens, most important dimensions of private economic and social activity. See also Statement of Senators Leahy, Kennedy, and Metzenbaum, id. at 179-84 (reform should result in less regulation in many areas, but it will also
lead to strengthening regulation in others in order to ensure improved response to
health, safety, and environmental problems of society); Presidential Campaign Speech of
Ronald Reagan in Youngstown, Ohic (October, 1979), reprinted in id. at 8 ("[M]any
regulations impair the ability of industries to compete, reduce workers' real income, and
destroy jobs . . . . We must ensure that regulations are limited to those necessary to
protect health, safety and the environment. However, we must not allow regulations to
flourish for their own sake.").
The foregoing discussion, of course, does not address the morass of state and local
administrative regulation for the licensing of professions and occupations, for the development of cities, and for the provision of health, safety, or moral necessities. See F.
HEFFRON & N. McFEELEY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY PROCESS 6-8 (1983):
State agencies, among other things, license physicians, barbers, lawyers, architects, cosmeticians, liquor dealers, and funeral directors, as well as regulate
commerce within their boundaries and provide the regulatory framework for
all levels of public educational institutions. Localities are charged with the
responsibility of enforcing building codes, fire, health, and safety regulations
and standards.
See also Silard, supra note 1, at 870 (transformation of "private sphere" into "public
interest" evidenced in proliferation of governmental regulation influencing general availability of such fundamentals as food, clothing, shelter, employment, and education).
Administrative regulation in the State of Washington extends to varied and unlikely
fields for public concern. See, e.g., Restricted Noxious Weed Seeds, WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 16-300-020 (1983); Regulation and Practice of Hearing Aid Fitters and Dispensers,
WASH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 308-50 (1983); Veterinary Code of Ethics, WASH. ADMIN. CODE
ch. 308-150 (1983); Curriculum for Manicurist Course of Instruction, WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 308-24-360 (1983).
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governmental interposition in all classifications of social relations runs the full gamut of degrees of involvement, it becomes
rationally impossible to dichotomize the categories of "private"
and "public" spheres of behavior.9 7 The choice of a stoppingplace between degrees of governmental intervention, or differing
choices for differing cases, is totally arbitrary when informed by
no other theoretical justification than the need to select some
point in the spectrum that runs from the individual to the
collectivity.9
The second presupposition also fails to circumscribe a
sphere of private conduct characterized by direct or indirect
governmental sanction. Legitimate state "police powers" are traditionally most extensive when exercised to regulate the private
use and enjoyment of interests of relative communal scarcity, 99
97. In counterargument, the following position may be asserted: granting an indeterminate, if not total, overlap between the spheres of public and private action, this does
not mean that the interrelated strands of governmental and private behaviors contributing to a single enterprise cannot be distinguished, identified as discrete public and private elements, and evaluated separately for their causal connection to the alleged injury.
This proposition characterizes, of course, the very analysis adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978), and in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
This Article regards' the Jackson and Flagg Bros. authorities as doctrinal retrenchment from the Court's prior rationales under the Theories of Identity and Causality. See
supra notes 21-32 and accompanying text. For narrative purposes, examination of the
indeterminacy of contemporary standards established by this retrenchment, and of the
incongruity of such standards for a "state action" concept, is reserved for the critique on
the Theory of Causality. See infra notes 106-15 and accompanying text.
To respond to the counterargument at this point, however, it suffices to claim that
the Jackson and Flagg Bros. analysis recognized implicitly the arbitrary nature of the
preexisting Theory of Identity. By requiring the plaintiff to identify discrete dimensions
or aspects of an integrated undertaking as "state-imprinted" or "nonstate-imprinted,"
see infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text, Jackson and Flagg Bros. effectively conceded the essential arbitrariness of a judicial effort to define the whole of any private
venture that is directly or indirectly regulated by state government as pertaining more to
the "public" sphere of influence than to the "private," or vice versa.
98. This observation has been otherwise explained as a necessary conclusion of positive jurisprudence. See, e.g., Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on
Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1301 (1982) (private action derives from
state, thus potentially implicating state in every private action not prohibited by law);
Burke & Reber, supra note 75, at 1104 (every form of interpersonal human behavior has
reference to the authority provided by state law). On separate theoretical grounds, this
observation has been described as an inevitable stage of judicial process in the disintegration of legal liberalism. Kennedy, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1352 (1982) (concept of "continuumization").
99. The text uses the phrase "interests of relative communal scarcity" with the purpose of remaining at a high level of conceptual generality. The phrase is meant to
include individual access to all things, which access is restricted by forces other than the
individual's free will. In more accurate, but necessarily more theoretical terms, the
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understood in American common and constitutional law to be
private affairs "affected with the public interest," whether that
scarcity is a function of natural causes or is created by the
state's law itself. 1' It is precisely in the contexts of relative comphrase includes all respects of, or relations to, tangible or intangible things that may
concern or affect an individual in an advantageous, detrimental, or neutral fashion,
viewed from the perspective of that individual, due to quantitative or qualitative conditions upon possession, use, or enjoyment, created by civil law, social interactions, or natural causes, or any combination of them. Such generality is justified by the probability
that no taxonomy of individual interests meeting the stated qualifications is likely to be
sufficiently comprehensive without being, at the same time, equally abstract.
100. Constitutional theorists generally agree that the American common law recognized the regulation of private affairs "affected with the public interest" to be a legitimate exercise of the governmental police power; the proper authority of state government comprehends the regulatory capacity to abridge individual interests when acting to
promote the security, health, and comfort of the whole community rather than that of
any particular sector. See W. CROSSKEY, supra note 62, at 1151 ("the courts maintained
that, if the act. . . was not in fact-that is, not in the Court's judgment-promotive of
'the common good' or 'the public health, safety, morals, or welfare,' it was in excess of
the legislature's power and, so, void and not a 'law.' "); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8-1, at 427-34 (1978); Rudolph & Rudolph, The Limits of JudicialReview
in Constitutional Adjudication, 63 NER. L. REv. 84, 91-92 (1984) (function of judicial
review is to ensure, in part, "that the agents of the community act in the interest of the
whole community rather than in the interest of special sectors").
The United States Supreme Court's substantive due process doctrine, developed
most fully after passage of the fourteenth amendment, cf. Graham, Procedure to Substance-Extra-JudicialRise of Due Process, 1830-1860, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 483, 484
(1952) (pre-Civil War evolution of substantive due process doctrine), understood state
governmental power to operate legitimately only for enhancement of the "general public
welfare" in those concerns "affected with the public interest." In the seminal case of
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (legislation setting rates for warehouse grain storage
in populous cities not violative of fourteenth amendment due process), the Court articulated the pre-1930s federal constitutional standard for legitimate state regulation of private enterprises "clothed with the public interest." Undertaking an exhaustive analysis
of the history of state regulation of private businesses, the Court observed that early
American state governments were permitted to control the behavior of their private citizens to prevent them from injuring one another. Id. at 124. This, according to the Court,
was the source in American common law of the authority characterized as "the police
powers" permitting governmental regulation of "the conduct of its citizens one towards
another, and the manner in which each shall use his own property, when such regulation
becomes necessary for the public good." Id. at 125.
Thus, state regulation of ferries, common carriers, bakers, millers, innkeepers, and
the like rests "in England from time immemorial, and in this country from its first colonization" upon the principles of Anglo-American common law that when private property is "affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only." Id. at 125-26
(quoting Lord Chief Justice Hale, De Portibus Mars, 1 HARGRAVE'S LAW TRACTS (Small
ed. 1853)). The Munn Court understood that private property would become clothed
with a public interest:
when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that
use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to

264

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 8:221

the extent of the interest he has thus created.
94 U.S. at 126. Finally, the Munn Court found that the plaintiff in error, a private grain
warehouseman, exercised a "sort of public office" in the operation of a "virtual" monopoly that most certainly is clothed "with a public interest." Id. at 131-32. The Munn
opinion established the proposition that a private activity or resource in the control of
one or a few property owners to which the public must or may resort essentially vests the
activity with a public interest and subjects it to state regulation under the government's
police powers.
Prior to 1934 the United States Supreme Court invalidated numerous state laws on
the basis that the legislation regulated areas of private concern not touched with the
public interest. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 560-61 (1923) (statutory minimum wage for women laborers'in hospital violated fifth amendment liberty to
contract because business not clothed with the public interest); Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 58 (1905) (state regulation of hours and wages of bakers violates fourteenth
amendment right to contract because measure neither protected a class of laborers who
were not sui juris nor directly promoted a legitimate public health, safety, or welfare
objective); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 585 (1897) (state may not limit right of
citizen to contract with business outside the state) ("Individual liberty of action must
give way to the greater right of the collective people in the assertion of well-defined
policy designed and intended for the general welfare.").
In contrast to the narrow construction of the concept "affected with a public interest" in these early decisions, post-1930s Supreme Court cases have extended the definition far beyond the categories of governmentally created or natural monopolies to
emphasize the legitimacy of governmental power to regulate societal scarcities caused by
detrimental private exertion of rights created by state law. See Nebbia v. New York, 291
U.S. 502, 523 (1934) (state regulation of minimum and maximum retail prices of milk to
ensure stable income to milk producers and an adequate market supply of milk does not
violate fourteenth amendment due process) ("[G]overnment cannot exist if the citizen
may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the
public to regulate it in the common interest."). The Nebbia Court defined "affected with
the public interest" to mean "no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is
subject to control for the public good." Id. at 536. Significantly, the Court also observed
that "[n]o exercise of private right can be imagined which will not in some respect, however slight, affect the public." Id. at 524-25. The Supreme Court reinforced the breadth
of Nebbia's understanding of the "public interest" concept in Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) (upheld state legislation requiring employer to permit
employee paid time off to vote). In Day-Brite, the Court posited that the police power
"extends to all great public needs," id. at 424, but that "the public welfare is a broad and
inclusive concept. The moral, social, economic and physical well being of the community
is one part of it; the political well being another." Id. at 425.
The United States Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on the "public
interest" doctrine is a testament to the remarkable breadth of the state police powers in
regulating interests of communal scarcity. The Court in Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984), upheld the Hawaii Land Reform Act of 1967, HAWAII REv. STAT.
ch. 516 (1977), against a challenge under the "public use" clause of the fifth amendment
of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. In order to reduce the concentration of 47% of the state's land in the hands
of 72 private landowners and trusts, the Land Reform Act created a land condemnation
scheme whereby title in real property was transferred from lessor to lessee upon the
determination of the Hawaii Housing Authority that the change of ownership would
effectuate the public purposes of the Act. The Court determined that the scheme was a
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munal scarcity thit one individual's exercise of freedom is more
likely than not to conflict with another's claim to security of an
interest as of right. As a general proposition, then, the
probability of actual, or potential and constitutionally legitimate, state governmental intervention in private interactions is
proportional to the probability of competing individual claims of
right in any societal context. °1 Therefore, the second presupposition suggests an indeterminate overlap between the domain of
private commerce and the genres of private powers delegated or
constitutionally legitimate exercise of the police power of eminent domain in the public
interest.
The Midkiff decision quoted extensively from the United States Supreme Court's
opinion in Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (District of Columbia Redevelopment
Act of 1945, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to -719 (1981), held constitutional), to establish
the standards for judicial review of a state legislature's determination that the public
interest justified use of eminent domain. The following statements are excerpts from
these quotations:
Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken,
the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive. In such
cases the legislature, not the judiciary, is the main guardian of the public needs
to be served by social legislation, whether it be Congress legislating concerning
the District of Columbia . . . or the States legislating concerning local affairs
....
Once the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. . . . [T]he means of executing
the project are for Congress and Congress alone to determine.
104 S. Ct. at 2329 (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32-33).
Concluding that "the 'public use' requirement is thus coterminous with
the scope of
a sovereign's police powers," the Midkiff opinion recognized that courts still had a "role
to play" in reviewing legislative judgment of public use in the exercise of the eminent
domain power. Nevertheless, the Court observed:
But the Court in Berman made clear that [the role] is "an extremely narrow"
one. . . . [T]he Court has made clear that it will not substitute its judgment
for a legislature's jufigment as to what constitutes a public use "unless the use
be palpably without reasonable foundation."
104 S. Ct. at 2329 (citations omitted).
Speculation on the ramifications of the Midkiff opinion in expanding the boundaries
of the "public interest" concept and the accompanying "public use" doctrine has been
dramatic. Professor Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School, who acted as Special Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii representing the state in Midkiff, has been quoted as
asserting: "The court is saying that any socioeconomic objective ... will justify the state
using eminent domain." The High Court: This Property Is Condemned, NEWSWEEK,
June 25, 1984, at 69. Professor Tribe "suggested that a state might interpret private art
collections-for example, if a small, elite group of collectors owned all the masterworks
of a Picasso or a van Gogh-as a substantial public harm and thereby force the sale of
those treasures to a public museum." Id.
101. As a corollary, it seems reasonable to presume that a charge of constitutionally
violative private exercise of governmentally authorized prerogatives is more likely than
not to arise in those arenas of interpersonal relations that the state previously has regulated in significant dimensions or legitimately might have regulated in full and proper
use of its police powers.
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properly exercisable by government."0 2
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v.
Kraemer'0 3 laid bare the inherently arbitrary nature of the federal Theory of Identity and, accordingly, the "state action" doctrine.10 4 The Court reasoned that state judicial enforcement of
discriminatory private agreements must be viewed as "state
action" inconsistent with prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment because effectuation of the substantive contractual terms
"empowered" private individuals to impose injury to another's
equal enjoyment of property rights.10 5 The holding in Shelley
102. The dysfunctional nature of the second presupposition certainly has not
escaped scholarly notice. Commentators generally attack a distinction among degrees of
governmental delegation/authorization of private power from a jurisprudential perspective, however, either (1) by arguing that "state action" is manifest whenever the law
recognizes the validity and/or enforceability of private action, see, e.g., Alexander, Cutting the Gordian Knot: State Action And Self-Help Repossession, 2 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 893, 897 (1975) (state officials are the ones who enforce the rights and privileges
granted by permissive actions); Black, supra note 1, at 98 (private discrimination exists
because sanctioned and tolerated by law); Brest, supra note 98, at 1315 (state acts whenever law exists authorizing private action); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for 'State
Action' Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 S. CAL. L. REV. 208, 209 (1957) (whenever state gives legal consequences to private transactions there is "state action"), or (2)
by arguing that a public act is manifest whenever the law denies a private claim of right,
see, e.g., Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment
'State Action' Requirement, 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 221, 229-30 (state grants legal deference
to challenged practice); Van Alstyne, Mr. Justice Black, Constitutional Review, and the
Talisman of State Action, 2 DUKE L.J. 219, 232 (1965) (reviewable "state action" inheres
in every state decision to deny something that a person claims as a matter of right).
Contra Burke & Reber, supra note 75, at 1107 (no "state action" as long as law is permissive in nature and leaves decision for initiating action totally within the realm of
private choice).
103. 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court enforcement of racially restrictive covenant in
private land sale contract constituted "state action" violative of fourteenth amendment
equal protection).
104. Illuminating and scholarly critiques of the Shelley opinion and its impact on
the evolution of the fourteenth amendment's "state action" doctrine are too numerous to
list. Those that most informed this argument include Glennon & Nowak, supra note 102,
at 239; Kennedy, supra note 98, at 1352; Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM.
L. REV. 1083, 1115 (1960); Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Rights Cases and
State Action Theory, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 297, 360 (1977); Van Alstyne & Karst,
State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3, 45-46 (1961).
105. The Court stated:
These are not cases, as has been suggested, in which the States have merely
abstained from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discriminations as they see fit. Rather, these are cases in which the States have made
available to such individuals the full coercive power of government to deny to
petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the enjoyment of property rights
....
[Jiudicial action is not immunized from the operation of the Fourteenth
Amendment simply because it is taken pursuant to the state's common-law
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effectively undermines any distinction under the federal Theory
of Identity between "public" power and legally cognizable "private" action, for it creates a "status relationship" between the
state and a private party at the point at which the private party
seeks judicial effectuation of a personal exercise of power. It is
theoretically and functionally impossible for law to define a
sphere of "private" action when jurisprudence does not recognize such action, if judicially enforceable, as "private." Having
equated judicially enforceable private action with state delegation or authorization of power, Shelley exposes the arbitrariness
of any Theory of Identity that attempts to resurrect the spheres
of private conduct and state involvement along the line of a less
attenuated relationship.
Like the Theory of Identity, the Theory of Causality lacks
operational content. Its contemporary rationales cannot distinguish in any determinate manner which among particular activities in a "status relationship," those attributable or those nonattributable to the state, can be held to have caused allegedly
unconstitutional injury. Recent doctrinal developments in the
Theory of Causality unveil its inutility. Its requirements radically narrow the realm of liability-creating state behavior
defined by the Theory of Identity, on the basis of unestablished
or immaterial criteria. Even more important, its requirements
challenge the viability of a "state action" doctrine.
The Supreme Court decisions in Jackson v. Metropolitan
Edison Co.'06 and Flagg Brothers v. Brooks" 7 turn upon the
same rationale, which articulates the contemporary standard for
the Theory of Causality. If one assumes a private actor sufficiently associated with the state under a Theory of Identity,
then the particular activity proximately causing the allegedly
unconstitutional injury cannot be ascribed to the state without
evidence that the state affirmatively compelled or affixed its
imprimatur on the side of the injurious conduct. Although the
policy. Nor is the Amendment ineffective simply because the particular pattern
of discrimination, which the State has enforced, was defined initially by the
terms of a private agreement.
334 U.S. at 89-90 (footnote omitted).
106. 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (no "state action" in termination of electrical service by
private utility company that was subject to extensive public regulation in many
particulars).
107. 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (no "state action" in warehouseman's sale of respondents'
belongings for nonpayment of storage charges pursuant to a state commercial law "selfhelp" provision).
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facts in Jackson and Flagg Brothers presented strong cases for
findings of "state action" under either the Pollack "ratification"
rationale"'8 or the Reitman "encouragement" rationale10 9 for the
Theory of Causality,11 0 the Court ruled that even explicit state
approval or authorization of private action generally taken in a
publicly regulated enterprise will not transmute specific private
practices into "state action" when the initiative for the particular activities comes from the private party and not from the
state.'1 '
As enunciated in Jackson and Flagg Brothers, the Theory
of Causality works at cross-purposes to the Theory of Identity.
The Theory of Causality's compulsion/imprimatur requirement
disallows state accountability for significant degrees of governmental involvement with nominally private action stemming
from the "status relationships" established by the Theory of
Identity's rationales. "Delegation" and "holding forth" understand the state to incur responsibility for privately inflicted
injury that it affirmatively enfranchised by delegation of govern108. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952). See supra note 31
and accompanying text.
109. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375-76 (1967). See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
110. The record in Jackson established that Pennsylvania law required the filing of
a general tariff by a private electrical utility company, including a description of penalty
terms that arguably might have applied to termination procedures, and authorized a 60day notice period before the effective date of general tariff rule changes, in which time
the Public Utilities Commission arguably had the power to veto unacceptable provisions.
419 U.S. at 355. Because Metropolitan Edison's termination procedures had been filed in
its general tariffs for many years and reiterated in its most recent version filed as part of
a rate increase proposal, id. at 354, the Commission's failure to overturn the company's
practices might have been deemed specific or constructive authorization of the termination proceedings A la Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollack, 343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952), upon
which the company relied to injure petitioner. Flagg Bros.' characterization of the New
York "self-help" provision as an announcement of the circumstances under which its
courts will not interfere with a private sale, 436 U.S. at 166, is an explicit recognition
that state law, in effect, had created an enforceable private right to action allegedly violative of respondents' due process rights, an "encouragement" in the style of Reitman v.
Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
111. The Supreme Court determined that the harmful behavior alleged in both
Jackson and Flagg Bros. constituted private action that the state, by legislation or regulation, may have permitted but did not compel. Because the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission had neither ordered, cooperated in, nor otherwise "put its own weight
on the side of the proposed [termination] practice," Pennsylvania was not deemed
accountable for Metropolitan Edison's actions in Jackson. 419 U.S. at 357. Because the
"self-help" provision challenged in Flagg Bros. merely allowed, but did not compel, the
private sale of stored goods, the warehouseman's unilateral execution of a lien was not
action fairly attributable to New York State. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 166.
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mentally exercised power or by authorization of conduct regulable within its legitimate police powers. The compulsion/imprimatur requirement, however, understands that any dimension or
facet of private activity can be identified effectively with the
state only by its official seal of approval or by evidence of its
direct control. Moreover, compulsion/imprimatur virtually
negates the "entwinement" rationales. Extensive state direction
of a nominally private enterprise will not likely implicate the
state in particular policies or practices complained of without
the state's significant involvement in the promulgation and/or
enforcement of these specific activities.
By refusing to attribute liability as necessarily coextensive
with the identification of the state and private actor, the Theory
of Causality invites the division of a "status relationship" into
those dimensions that are state-imprinted or nonstateimprinted,' 1 2 and further division of state-imprinted dimensions
into facets that are injury-causative and injury-noncausative.
This is all highly problematic. Decisional law simply does not
begin to describe how an integrated private venture, series of
private activities, or a single and continuous action should be
sectionalized, or how the various dimensions are to be differentiated, as merely state delegated and approved, or as significantly
bearing the state's "imprimatur."" ' Assuming definitive rules
for the first division, the compulsion/imprimatur requirement
does not even address the central concern of a Theory of Causality. It provides no standards by which to prioritize the truncated
dimensions of a "status relationship" as more or less directly
and proximately causative of the injury complained of; nor does
it suggest and justify a methodology to weigh these factors and
to call the judgment of state liability." 4
112. "State-imprinted" and "nonstate-imprinted" are terms derived from the contemporary standard for the Theory of Causality articulated in Jackson and Flagg Bros.
See supra text accompanying notes 106-11. "State-imprinted" action defines conduct
that the state affirmatively compelled or affixed with its "imprimatur." "Nonstateimprinted" action, of course, defines conduct that is not "state-imprinted."
113. The sole standard mentioned in Jackson, the source of initiative for action, 419
U.S. at 357, is insufficient to this division, if not totally irrelevant, since significant ratification or compulsion may as likely follow commencement of behavior as precede it.
114. The Article argues that the contemporary "compulsion/imprimatur" standard
articulated by Jackson and Flagg Bros. for the Theory of Causality suffers gravely from
a lack of operational content because decisional law implementing the standard provides
no determinate and coherent guidelines for distinguishing the "injury-causative stateimprinted" dimensions of a private enterprise that may give rise to unconstitutional
"state action." A legitimate objection to this argument is that the author's perspective

270

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 8:221

Even more devastating to the Theory of Causality than
these definitional problems, however, is the challenge that the
compulsion/imprimatur requirement poses to the very import of
a "state action" doctrine. As the "state action" concept seeks to
locate the point at which nominally private behavior must be
deemed beholden to state power, and thereby subject to the presumption of security of right, the doctrine presupposes that
may be short-sighted: to demonstrate the lack of operational content in the Supreme
Court decisions implementing the contemporary standard for the Theory of Causality is
not to prove the standard itself as failing in operational content.
Ultimately, the objection points to a dispute over reasonable faith in the institutional competence of the federal courts. Is it more probable than not that the courts can
and will develop cogent, comprehensive, and precise rules that can and will be applied
uniformly and consistently to distinguish the interrelated strands of governmental and
private behaviors contributing to all publicly and privately integrated undertakings, to
identify the strands as discrete public and private elements, and to evaluate each separately for the nature, scope, and intensity of its causal connection to the alleged injury?
Unless this necessarily speculative inquiry is reasonably answered in the affirmative, the
distinction between the lack of operational content in doctrinal rulings and in the contemporary standard itself is an academic question, and likely of little interest even to
academics.
The Supreme Court's track record in performing such feats of categorical analysis
for comparable requirements of other federal constitutional doctrines is uninspiring, and
it speaks for itself. Witness the utter failure of the Court, in the evolution of the interstate commerce clause doctrine, to articulate meaningful and serviceable distinctions
between private control over the "transportation" of an item, legitimately reached by
congressional exercise of the commerce power, and control by the same integrated private industry over the "manufacture" of the item, which eludes the constitutional reach
of Congress' commerce power. Compare United States v. E.C.. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 15
(1895) (Congress cannot regulate a monopoly in "manufacture" as an exercise of its
interstate commerce power); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310 (1936) (Congress cannot regulate maximum hours and minimum wages in coal mines because the
effect of labor provisions falls primarily upon "production" and not upon "commerce"
defined as "intercourse for the purposes of trade") with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 117 (1941) (interstate commerce power extends to local activities in production or
manufacture having substantial effect on commerce in the objects produced; Carter Coal
doctrine expressly limited); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (federal commerce power extends to regulation of wheat production intended solely for consumption
on the farm) ("questions of federal power cannot be decided simply by finding the activity in question to be 'production' nor can consideration of its economic effects be foreclosed by calling them 'indirect' "). Similarly, re-examine the collapse of the Court's differentiations in the economic substantive due process doctrine between private
enterprises "clothed with the public interest" that are legitimate subjects for state police
power regulation and private activity not touched with the public interest and subject to
control for the public good. See supra note 100.
Even conceding the possibility that the "compulsion/imprimatur" requirement could
be made workable, a solution to the problem of operational content is only the advent to
the central problem with this contemporary standard for the Theory of Causality. The
more effective the operation of the "compulsion/imprimatur" standard, the stronger the
negation of any purpose or meaning for a "state action" doctrine at all. See infra 115 and
accompanying text.
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complainant's injury was not caused by any purely governmental
action. ' The compulsion/imprimatur requirement undermines
this presupposition. At the point of explicit ratification or
express order of private behavior, the state entity might be held
itself to have executed the injurious conduct through an agent or
deputy. With affirmative and direct state action in such
instances, the "status relationships" defined by the federal Theories of Identity and Causality become confusing superfluities.
Washington's wholesale incorporation of the federal Theories of Identity and Causality opens its "state action" doctrine
to the same attacks. For more than operational reasons, however, the Washington doctrine cannot serve the normative purpose of reinforcing legal liberalism. The "state action" doctrine
in the Washington Bill of Rights determines whether a constitutional claim presents a justiciable question and a substantive
cause of action on the basis of the identity of the alleged wrongdoer. The doctrine distinguishes between real-world harm to
interests of constitutional significance (that is, harm that may or
may not be found, after a hearing on the merits, to be actual
injury to a constitutionally secured right) when imposed by state
actors, only because they are state actors, and real-world harm
of similar nature, scope, and intensity, to interests of constitutional significance when imposed by private actors, only because
they are not state actors. Because the "state action" doctrine
uses this distinction to establish both the state judicial cognizance of an article I claim and an indispensable substantive element of a cause of action under article I, the doctrine sabotages
the very core of the liberal legal tenet of security of right.
Classical liberalism understood that a purely private exercise of liberty might tread too severely upon another individual's
freedom to pursue preferred ends and that the balance between
reasonable impositions (that is, socially tolerable by-products of
primarily "self-regarding" activity) and unreasonable impositions (that is, socially intolerable effects of primarily "otherregarding" activity) is a decision that cannot be left to the selfinterested private disputants, but must be made by government
as the trustee of the public welfare." 6 In order to discharge this
duty satisfactorily, government in the liberal legal state must
115. See supra note 1.
116. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (discussion of inherent tension
between tenets of liberty and security of right, and classical resolution of conflict).
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grant effective and meaningful access to its dispute resolution
tribunals to a complainant who alleges that personal freedoms
were infringed too severely by another's exercise of private
power and alleges that, in this context, the complainant's freedoms should be secured by law.
The "state action" doctrine, however, barricades the threshold of the state courthouses to such a charge made under the
Washington Bill of Rights. The doctrine defines as nonjusticiable any claim that private conduct may have imposed socially
intolerable restraints on the scope or intensity of particular liberties that are expressly vested in the complainant by article I of
the Washington Constitution. Even though governmental recognition and defense of enumerated liberties have been deemed so
important as to be required in the state government's enabling
charter, the "state action" doctrine empowers the judiciary to
protect these liberty interests only as against governmental
actors. The doctrine prevents justiciability of claims against private infringement by establishing the public identity of the
alleged wrongdoer as a necessary and unconditional element of a
substantive cause of action under article I. Invariably, the "state
action" doctrine differentiates in the potential for real-world
injury to constitutional liberties by means of the source of injury
alone.
Finding a normative difference in injury to constitutional
interests as a function of the identity of the source alone can be
comprehended if private actors were never capable of imposing
real-world harm to liberty concerns commensurate in kind and
degree to harm inflicted by public actors. As the dispositive criterion for a substantive claim of right, the public or private
identity of the alleged wrongdoer loses significant normative
value if private conduct may be as realistically damaging in
nature, breadth, or severity to another's freedoms as state conduct can be.
In the context of "state action" theory, to ask whether private persons may be conceived to cause essentially the same
deprivations of liberty interests as governmental entities is, in
effect, to answer the question. As prior discussion established,
the rationalizing principle of the Theory of Identity is that private individuals and enterprises are functionally capable of
"other-regarding" manners and resulting impacts characteristic
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of public officials and institutions. 1 17 Judicial efforts to formulate workable principles for the Theory of Identity attest to the
perception that, under certain conditions or circumstances, private actors may exercise sufficient economic, political, or social
power to perpetrate real-world injury to constitutional interests
that is equivalent in type or effect to the harm possible by direct
exertion of state governmental power by public actors. This judicial perception is certainly justified from the perspective of the
injured right-holder: for example, it is unlikely that the Alderwood Associates plaintiffs would have viewed prohibitions on
soliciting initiative signatures in the private shopping center as
any less detrimental to their political speech interests than similar restrictions on petitioning in the public streets." 8
117. The rationalizing principle of the Theory of Identity was explained, in part,
through analysis of the two presuppositions underlying the "status relationships" developed by the United States Supreme Court to find state accountability for private conduct. See supra notes 94-102 and accompanying text. The failure of the two presuppositions to circumscribe distinct realms of public and private behavior suggested an
indeterminate overlap between the domain of private action and the genres of power
legitimately exercisable by state government.
118. The text asserts that, from the perspective of the injured right-holder, individuals acting in their private capacities are as functionally capable of realizing the same
injury to constitutional rights as public officials or institutions. This assertion may be
faulted for begging the question of the nature of "right" safeguarded by, and the nature
of "injury" prohibited by the Washington Constitution.
The critique might run as follows: the assertion defines constitutional "right" and
"injury" in terms of the deprivation to the right-holder's being, action, or entitlements,
and assumes the perspective of the right-holder to evaluate the character and dimensions
of the deprivation suffered; whereas the concepts of constitutional "right" and "injury"
might be defined in terms of the identity of the perpetrator of harm, and restricted to
real-world deprivations suffered at the hands of an officer or institution of public government. Defining constitutional "right" and "injury" in this latter fashion, the text's assertion is incorrect as a matter of logic. Perforce, private parties are inherently incapable of
"injury" to a constitutional "right" that can only be deprived by a public individual or
entity. In conclusion, the presumption of security of constitutional "right" is understood
in terms of the Washington "state action" doctrine and consequently cannot be undermined by its effective operation.
A complete response to this critique must demonstrate that the normative objectives
of legal liberal theory are satisfied more fully by defining the presumption of security of
constitutional "right" for purposes of the "state action" doctrine from the perspective of
the potential right-holder. Such a response is beyond the scope of this Article, and will
be attempted in a forthcoming article on the federal "state action" doctrine. It must
suffice here to recognize the existence of the critique, and to offer the mere skeleton of a
partial response.
Liberal legal theory justifies the existence of government as the means to enhance
"ordered liberty": personal powers of self-help against private wrongdoers are exchanged
in theory for personal security against private wrongdoers under the rule of law. No just
government can deny access to its instrumentalities for resolution of grievances at the
same time that it prohibits all effective alternative means of fending off real-world
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Once conceding that private persons conceivably realize
harm to constitutional interests of other private parties that is
functionally similar to that possible by governmental action, the
public or private identity of an alleged wrongdoer is normatively
suspect when it operates as a determinate element of a substantive claim under the Washington Bill of Rights. If public or private identity cannot serve meaningfully to distinguish natures
and degrees of real-world injuries to constitutionally secured
freedoms, it does not serve justifiably as a sine qua non for a
substantive cause of action alleging deprivation of these freedoms. By raising the issue of public or private identity to the
level of an indispensable condition to a cognizable claim of right
under article I, the Washington "state action" doctrine restricts
the constitutional authority of the state courts to secure personal liberties as against private infringements realistically as
severe as public infringements. Because it conclusively establishes both justiciability and the substantive sufficiency of a constitutional claim of right on an indeterminate measure for harm,
the "state action" doctrine is normatively underinclusive in its
purpose to attain legal liberalism's promise of security of right.
All this is not to say that the public or private identity of
the alleged wrongdoer is normatively irrelevant to a decision on
the merits of an article I case. In the context of any particular
harms. To define the "right" presumably secured by government in terms of the public
identity of the wrongdoer, however, is to tolerate the likelihood of denying personal
security to victims of nonstate harm; unless the law authorizes self-help measures or
otherwise affords appropriate relief by enforcement of statutory or common-law remedies, the "state action" doctrine forecloses the sole remaining legal avenue in the Washington Constitution for promoting "ordered liberty." On the other hand, when "right"
and "injury" are defined in terms of the deprivation to the right-holder's real-world
interests, the presumption of security is fostered to its fullest theoretical extent; the
acceptance or rejection of a claim of security as of right will be based upon a consideration of all potentially relevant factors for balancing conflicting claims of liberty and
security, and not prejudiced automatically by the single factor of the public or private
identity of the wrongdoer.
In light of this explanation, the proponent of the "identity of perpetrator perspective" for the Washington "state action" doctrine's definition of constitutional "right"
and "injury" must demonstrate why liberal legal theory should regard state-inflicted
harm as categorically more repugnant than nonstate-inflicted harm. Conceivably, the
proponent may attempt to prove that state machinery is more prone to inflicting realworld deprivations than nonstate actors, that such deprivations are likely to be more
devastating to the victim physically, emotionally, or psychologically when inflicted by the
state, or that these deprivations are recognized uniformly by society as desirable means
to achieve some greater normative end. Unless some such rationale is asserted and substantiated persuasively, the "identity of the perpetrator perspective" should be rejected
as a normatively unjustified and inappropriate viewpoint.
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controversy, the state courts may justify a more stringent standard of liability for a state official or entity than for a private
individual or organization on the normative basis that the governors of the body politic are held to a higher level of responsibility in certain instances than are mere members of its constituency.19 It is one thing, however, for the courts to ascribe
independent significance to the public nature of a defendant
when weighing opposing claims to security of a constitutional
right and to a legitimate exercise of power; it is quite another for
the courts to search for public identity so that a private conflict
may be adjudicated as a constitutional dispute.
The bitter irony in this normative deficiency is that the
"state action" doctrine originally evolved in federal constitutional law with the understanding that state law would provide
adequate recourse to determine the validity of, and due redress
for, alleged violations of civil liberties secured by state statutes
and common law, or guaranteed by the state constitution.'
With respect to the normative underpinnings of the federal
"state action" doctrine, the Washington constitutional "state
action" doctrine operates counter-intuitively. When state statutory and common law does not provide an adequate remedy for
alleged injury to civil liberties guaranteed by the state constitution, the claimant's only recourse is under the constitution itself.
The injured party should not be denied access to a governmental
determination of the validity of a claim to a secured right and to
redress because the injuring party is not itself the state.2 '
119. This is not to propose, however, a smuggling back of the "state action" inquiry
as an indispensable and conclusive determinant on the merits, in the manner of "definitional balancing" portrayed in one of the possible readings of Alderwood Assocs. See
supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text (critique of the balancing approach to establish a cognizable cause of action under art. I, § 5 of the Washington Constitution,
endorsed by the plurality opinion of the court).
120. Mr. Justice Bradley's majority opinion in the The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883), based the Court's invalidation of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, in part, on the
rationale that
[i]t applies equally to cases arising in States which have the justest laws
respecting the personal rights of citizens, and whose authorities are ever ready
to enforce such laws, as to those which arise in States that may have violated
the prohibition of the amendment. In other words, it steps into the domain of
local jurisprudence, and lays down rules for the conduct of individuals in society towards each other, and imposes sanctions for the enforcement of those
rules, without referring in any manner to any supposed action of the State or
its authorities.
Id. at 14.
121. Examination of the rationally unjustifiable reconstruction of both the Theory
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DISMANTLING THE WASHINGTON "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE:
RECOGNIZING A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT to STATE ACTION

Washington's Bill of Rights declares the raison d'etre for
state government. Two provisions of article I direct the institutions of state government to aspire to the quintessence of legal
liberalism:
Article I, Section 1. POLITICAL POWER. All political power
is inherent in the people, and governments derive their just
powers from the consent of the governed, and are established
to protect and maintain individual rights.'2 2
Article I, Section 32. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES. A frequent recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual right and the perpetuity of free
government.

123

Sections 1 and 32 of article I jointly mandate the duality in liberal governance; at the same time that state government maintains the realm of individual liberty, it must meaningfully protect and secure the fruits of individual rights exercised.
Undoubtedly, these provisions have been regarded by the
Washington judiciary as essentially platitudinal, and as platitudinal, essentially ignored. The unimaginative transplantation of
the federal "state action" doctrine into the state constitution
certainly reflects such an attitude. In the context of claims to
constitutionally secured rights, however, sections 1 and 32 may
be infused with fresh and vibrant meaning. The Washington
courts should recognize that the two provisions warrant a fundamental right to state action for protection of constitutional liberties against private infringement. So recognized, the fundamental right to state action requires the dismantling of the
Washington "state action" doctrine as a barrier to justiciability
of constitutional claims against private parties.
Sections 1 and 32 certify that state government exists for
the purpose of protecting individual civil liberties. In addition to
private entitlements vested as matters of right by state statutory, regulatory, and common law, civil liberties are enshrined in
of Identity and the Theory of Causality in recent United States Supreme Court decisions, and analysis of the normative unjustifiability of the federal "state action" doctrine,
will be pursued fully in a forthcoming article by this author on the internal and external
corrosion of the federal "state action" concept.
122. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 1.
123. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 32.
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the state constitution, a majority of which are enumerated in the
remainder of article I. When a litigant sues a private party
under the Washington Constitution, the litigant claims, in
essence, that state government is required by its enabling document to protect the entitlement to civil liberty granted therein.
Washington State government is compelled to provide protection because the defendant, a private individual or entity, allegedly has acted in a fashion adversely affecting the constitutional
civil liberties to be secured to all citizens by the state. The fundamental right to state action in the context of constitutional
litigation, then, is the guarantee that the judiciary will resolve
the line-drawing problem of legal liberalism by a full and fair
hearing of the competing claims of the private parties invoking
its power. The state courts must determine by examination of
the merits of the constitutional claims whether the constitution
secures an interest as of right to the complainant and whether
this interest has been injured unduly by the private opponent's
exercise of an alleged liberty.
The state courts cannot qualify this fundamental right to
justiciability of constitutional causes for private injury by the
traditional "state action" requirement. Doing so, the state government itself will have acted affirmatively and deliberately not
to secure the individual liberties allegedly vested in the claimant. Because of the operational and normative bankruptcy of the
"state action" theories, the state judiciary cannot employ the
doctrine at the threshold of constitutional litigation to perform
meaningfully the sensitive task of balancing competing private
substantive concerns. Adherence to the "state action" inquiry as
a formalistic tool to strike the balance would amount to active
state denial of due process in failing to secure constitutional
rights. Only by a conscious and thorough weighing of the merits
of conflicting private claims to liberty and to security of right
can the state judiciary discharge its constitutional duty to maintain liberalism's duality.
To establish that a fundamental right to state action
requires the dismantling of the Washington "state action" doctrine, of course, is not to assert that state courts are forbidden
constitutionally to regard the public or private identity of an
alleged wrongdoer as a relevant factor in reaching particular
judgments on the merits. As prior discussion in section V con-
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firmed,"2 4 a party's affiliation with state government may be normatively significant in resolving a dispute between competing
private constitutional claims. It is conceivable that the success of
a litigant's cause may be influenced, even decisively, by the
strength of the nexus between the public or private identity of
the adversary (or, perhaps even more relevant, the public or private character of the activity for which the adversary seeks constitutional protection) and the core value of the constitutional
guarantee asserted by the adversary, relative to the strength of
the nexus between the personal interests alleged and the core
value of the constitutional provision relied upon by the litigant.1 25 Assuming that the judiciary considers the public or pri124. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
125. For example, all other considerations being equal, a female complainant may be
more likely to prevail on a claim to equal protection in the right of expressive association, as against a challenge by the defendant on the basis of the right of intimate association or privacy, in Case 1 than in Case 2:
Case 1: Female complainant seeks admission to a state electoral candidate debate
sponsored by a male-only private social club, this particular event being
held open with nominal charge to male members of the general public.
Case 2: Female complainant seeks membership to the same private social club,
which engages in diverse state and local civic activities generally restricted
to the club's members, the activities varying in political, business, charitable, and social natures.
Arguably, the nexus between the complainant's alleged interests and the judicially
recognized value of the constitutional guarantee for expressive association is stronger in
Case 1 than in Case 2. If the freedom of expressive association is construed to be a
correlative right to substantive speech liberties, then its core value is implicated more
greatly when the complainant seeks to engage in primarily political speech activity than
when she seeks involvement in functions that may be primarily social, commercial, or
charitable in nature. Moreover, arguably the nexus between defendant's alleged privacy
interests and the right of intimate association is stronger in Case 2 than Case 1. If the
freedom of intimate association protects personal relationships that exhibit seclusion
from the public at large, a high degree of selectivity in affiliation, and human enrichment
from close ties to a limited number of individuals, then its fundamental value may be
dissipated as the private organization opens its functions to the general public, the sole
criterion for admission being male gender, with the expectation that many participants
may not share the sex-segregated preferences of the club members. For further guidance
in evaluating the relative strength of competing private claims to associational rights in
the context of federal constitutional law, see Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104 S. Ct.
3244 (1984) (enunciates a theory of first amendment rights of intimate and expressive
association and analyzes the "interface" between the right of association and equal protection doctrines).
It is well beyond the scope of this Article to propose a comprehensive scheme for
judicial weighting of public or private status in deciding the merits of conflicting private
constitutional claims. Nevertheless, at the risk of introducing meaningless generalizations, one may inquire cautiously whether the importance given the factor of identity
should not correlate in some prototypical fashion with other determinations indispensable in state constitutional adjudication. For example, all other variables remaining con-
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vate status of parties or particular activities material at all to
judgment on the merits of a specific controversy, strands of
reasoning first evolved in the traditional "state action" doctrine
possibly will re-emerge through judicial attempts to characterize
such status.' 26 Provided that the issue of public or private identity of parties or activities does not become an independent and
categorically conclusive determinant of the merits of private
constitutional disputes, judicial use of the familiar "status relationship" rationales is not problematic. The rationales then
serve only to define and characterize a variable (or a set of variables) that will be ascribed significance only in relation to other
factors material to a final judgment on the merits.
Though Washington's repudiation of the "state action" doctrine is theoretically and realistically justified, it would likely be
perceived as a highly progressive, if not radical, maneuver in
state constitutional jurisprudence; to date, no state has abandoned the "state action" requirement for all constitutional
causes of action against private parties. Washington's achievement would be foreshadowed, however, by important movements
in sister states to construe their respective constitutions as a
source of rights against certain forms of private behavior that
cannot be identified with the states themselves.
Following the lead of California in Robins v. Pruneyard
Shopping Center,2 7 several states have found the rights of free
speech and association, guaranteed under their constitutions,
stant, is the importance of the public/private identity of the defendant or defendant's
activities inversely related to the constitutional and societal importance of the liberty
interest asserted by the plaintiff?. Inversely related to the defendant's participation in a
widespread practice, custom, or policy of the relevant community? Positively related to
the defendant's assertion of rights distinguished by attributes of intimate association?
Any attempt to respond to these and similar questions is not to be ventured here. For an
interesting proposal for balancing the distinctive aspects of federal judicial decisionmaking under the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, see generally Van Alstyne &
Karst, supra note 104.
126. Although not inevitable, judicial reliance upon the traditional "status relationship" rationales to establish the public or private status of parties or their activities is
quite possible, as evidenced by the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Alderwood
Assocs. In evaluating the strength of the shopping center's privacy expectations in the
use of property, the Alderwood Assocs. plurality engaged in analysis resembling the "delegation" and "holding forth" rationales developed under the Theory of Identity. See
supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussion of Alderwood Assocs. balancing
methodology).
127. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979) (California Constitution
protects rights of speech and petition, sensibly exercised, in privately owned shopping
centers), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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protectable not only against public violation, but under some
circumstances against purely private infringements as well, particularly in the context of political advocacy. In Robins, the California Supreme Court read the state constitutional liberties of
speech and petition more expansively than their federal counterparts, permitting reasonable governmental restrictions on the
property rights of private shopping centers. Rather than characterizing the center as "holding forth" as a public forum under
the "state action" doctrine, the court assessed the merits of the
competing private claims by balancing the actual intrusion to
legitimate expectations of privacy of the property owner against
the primary value accorded constitutionally to political speech
activities and the state's traditional police power to condition
the private rights of property use for the public welfare.12 s New
Jersey" 9 and Pennsylvania,1 3 0 relying centrally on Robins, have
recognized similar judicial power under their state constitutions
to qualify the exercise of private property rights in the promotion of public policy favoring the personal liberties of speech,
association, and petition.
An even more notable harbinger of the death of the state
constitutional "state action" doctrine is the recent evolution in
Pennsylvania law of constitutionally implied common-law causes
of action against private parties. The Pennsylvania inferior
courts have allowed nonstatutory wrongful discharge claims in
tort and contract raised by at-will employees to survive motions
for nonsuit, on the rationale that an employer's property and
liberty interests may be circumscribed, regardless of state governmental action or inaction, when a termination violates a clear
mandate of public policy derived from state constitutional guarantees of personal liberties. 31 In effect, the Pennsylvania courts
128. Id. at 908, 592 P.2d at 346, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
129. See State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 567-69, 425 A.2d 615, 632-33 (1980) (although
not engaged in "state action," Princeton University, a private institution of higher learning, is subject to reasonable state regulations to protect state constitutional speech and
assembly rights against oppressive restrictions in access to property generally committed
to public use).
130. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 495 Pa. 158, 175, 432 A.2d 1382, 1391 (1981) (private college, which had assembled a public audience to hear a lecture by the director of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, could not, consistent with state constitutional guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition, invoke standardless permit requirements to
prevent distribution of leaflets outside of the lecture hall in an area normally open to the
public).
131. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 32-33, 386 A.2d 119,
120-21 (1978) (common-law cause of action implied directly from state constitution for
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understand that the explicit enumeration of individual rights in
the state constitution vests these specific liberties with particular public importance, and that their abridgment by private
action legitimately may generate a state common-law cause of
action.
Not only does Pennsylvania authority support the dismantlement of Washington's "state action" doctrine, but it also
argues for judicial discovery of the fundamental right to state
action under the Washington Constitution. There is no essential
difference between Pennsylvania's constitutional implication of
common-law actions to protect public policy against private
threats and Washington's recognition of a constitutional right to
judicial securement of personal liberties against private infringement. The former approach merely introduces the public policy
doctrine as a mediating principle to rationalize the jurisprudential objective of the latter approach, the justiciability of actions
for private invasion of constitutionally declared individual
rights. The doctrinal advantages in the approach proposed for
the Washington Constitution cannot be overstated, however. By
subscribing to the fundamental right to state action, the state
judiciary announces in a forthright and clarion fashion its commitment to meaningful security of state constitutional liberties.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Efforts of the Washington Supreme Court in Alderwood
Associates to enlighten state constitutional doctrine revealed
that the bench largely perceived a campaign to foresake the
"state action" concept as revolutionary.1 32 Judicial renunciation
wrongful discharge of private employee resulting from performance of jury duty); cf.
Hunter v. Port Auth., 277 Pa. Super. 4, 12, 419 A.2d 631, 635 (1980) (in recognizing the
nonstatutory wrongful discharge claim of the public employee, the court noted that
Pennsylvania law permits direct causes of action under the state constitution despite
legislative inaction).
Sitting in diversity jurisdiction in Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898
(3d Cir. 1983), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit interpreted
Pennsylvania law to acknowledge a tort and contract common-law cause of action against
a private employer for termination of complainant's employment, allegedly a retaliation
for the complainant's refusal to support the company's political lobbying efforts. The
Third Circuit took into consideration the importance of the political speech and associational freedoms secured by the federal and state constitutions to find a cognizable
expression of public policy sufficient to sustain a cause of action for wrongful discharge
under Pennsylvania law.
132. Lest this statement be regarded as hyperbolic, note the language and tone of
Justice Dolliver's separate opinion in Alderwood Assocs., concurring in the result but not
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of the "state action" justiciability barrier in the Washington
Constitution would not be a reaction to a cry for revolution, but
the response of an appeal to reason. Since the "state action"
doctrine fulfills no instrumental or normative function appropriate to state constitutional law decision-making, its abandonment
is dictated by reason.
No revolution, this!

the reasoning of the plurality opinion of the Court. His concurrence states, in pertinent
part:
[TIhis is the first time the court has held the Declaration of Rights in our
constitution is designed not just to protect the individual from government but
that it may also be used by one individual against the other. It is constitutionmaking by the judiciary of the most egregious sort. . . . This court, however,
should not expand its views of the fundamental meaning of the constitution-and thus the power of the court-at the expense of the will of the people. As it articulates constitutional rights it "chooses" to declare, the majority
also arrogates to the court powers undreamed of by those who wrote and those
who adopted our constitution . . . . Now there is no limit to the range of
wrongs which this court may right-subject only to the court's notion of balancing interests. With acceptance of the majority position, the need for a statute will become secondary and the "encourage[ment] in American life" of the
"private structuring of individual relationships and [the] repair of their
breach" can be set aside for the beneficient guardianship of the state courts.
Today, the term "imperial judiciary" takes on new meaning.
96 Wash. 2d at 248-51, 635 P.2d at 118-20 (Dolliver, J., concurring) (citations omitted).

